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PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY

AGUINALDO AND THE AMERICAN GENERALS

FROM

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THE FALL OF MANILA, AUGUST, 1898,

TO

THE ILOILO EXPEDITION, JANUARY, 1899.

THE PARTING OF THE WAYS.

FIRST SERIES.

V.

February 8, 1901.

This pamphlet may be obtained
by application to L. K. Fuller,
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THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY.

OUTLINE OF FIRST SERIES.

THE STORY OF THE FILIPINOS,

AS TOLD IN UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS AND OTHER AUTHENTIC PUBLICATIONS.

I. José Rizal, the Filipino Patriot: together with an account of the Insurgent Movement of 1896.

II. Aguinaldo: a Selection from his Official Documents, together with the Authorized Accounts of the alleged "Spanish Bribe."

III. The Insurgent Government of 1898.

IV. Our Relations with the Insurgents prior to the Fall of Manila, August, 1898.

V. Aguinaldo and the American Generals, August, 1898, to January, 1899.

VI. Iloilo: An Episode of January, 1899, and Incidents leading up to the Outbreak of Hostilities.

VII. Outbreak of Hostilities February 4, 1899.

VIII. Efforts to secure an Armistice, April and May, 1899.

IX. Efforts at Recognition, October and November, 1899.

X. Present Condition and Attitude.

NOTE. It will be impossible to bring out the circulars in their chronological order owing to the difficulty and delay in securing certain of the necessary official documents, some of which, indeed, are not yet in our hands. Every effort will be made, however, consistent with thoroughness and accuracy to issue them as soon as possible.

3049 a-5

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TABLE OF DATES FOR 1898.

Battleship Maine destroyed	Feb. 15, 1898.
Meeting between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo	April 24, 1898.
Dewey cables for Aguinaldo to join him	April 24, 1898.
War with Spain declared	April 26, 1898.
Battle of Manila Bay	May 1, 1898.
Aguinaldo brought down by U. S. S. McCulloch	May 19, 1898.
Military Government of Filipinos organized	June 18, 1898.
Revolutionary Government of Filipinos organized	June 23, 1898.
First American Troops landed under command of General Anderson	June 30, 1898.
Filipino Republic proclaimed	July 3, 1898.
General Merritt arrives	July 25, 1898.
Filipinos, on request, withdraw part of Troops surrounding Manila	July 29, 1898.
Peace Protocol signed; Peace declared between Spain and United States	Aug. 12, 1898.
Spaniards surrender Manila	Aug. 13, 1898.
Insurgents evacuate Suburbs of Manila	Sept. 15, 1898.
Filipino Congress meets at Malolos	Sept. 15, 1898.
Meeting of Peace Commission at Paris	Oct. 1, 1898.
Spanish Commissioners accept offer of \$20,000,000	Nov. 28, 1898.
Treaty of Peace agreed to in Paris	Dec. 10, 1898.
Orders sent from Washington for Iloilo Expedition	Dec. 23, 1898.
Spanish Garrison at Iloilo surrenders to the Filipinos	Dec. 24, 1898.
Congress at Malolos adjourns	Dec. 26, 1898.
Americans demand surrender of Iloilo	Dec. 28, 1898.
President's Cablegram defining Policy received in Manila	Dec. 29, 1898.

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AGUINALDO AND THE AMERICAN GENERALS.

AUGUST, 1898, TO JANUARY, 1899.

I. OPENING STATEMENT.

[NOTE. The documents referred to in this pamphlet are officially known as follows :

Senate Document 62, 55th Congress, 3d Session, Treaty of Peace and Accompanying Papers.

Senate Document 66, 56th Congress, 1st Session, Affairs in the Philippine Islands.

Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session, Communications between Aguinaldo and the Executive Departments of the United States.

Report of the First Philippine Commission to the President, 1900.

Report of Major-General E. S. Otis, U. S. V., on Military Operations and Civil Affairs in the Philippine Islands, 1899.

Report of Rear Admiral George Dewey for 1898.

Report of the Secretary of War for 1898.]

It is the purpose of this pamphlet to collect as much of the correspondence between Aguinaldo and the American generals, from August, 1898, to January, 1899, as is accessible. A knowledge of the events that took place during this period is of the utmost importance to any one desiring to determine the origin of the conflict, February 4, 1899. It is believed that the written communications between the generals of the two armies during this time furnish us with important data on this subject. As a series of letters more or less technical must of necessity be laborious reading, the editors have divided them into groups according to the matter contained in them, and have prefixed to each group an outline of its

contents. Some preliminary extracts showing the general conditions in Manila during the year 1898 may assist towards an understanding of the correspondence given.

A. Opposing Policies.

On April 24, 1898, Aguinaldo stated to Consul Pratt, at Singapore, the policy by which he meant to be governed in his dealings with his people. This statement, published at Singapore on the 4th of May, 1898, and mailed to Washington next day, is in substance as follows :*

"Aguinaldo's Policy.

"General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers. American protection would be desirable temporarily on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba." Aspirations
of the insur-
gent leaders.

July 22, Admiral Dewey cabled as follows : †

"HONGKONG, *July 22, 1898.*

"SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, *Washington :*

"The following is for the Secretary of War : —

"Aguinaldo declares dictator (ship) and martial law over all the islands. The people expect independence. Recommend China ponies.

"ANDERSON, *Commanding.*

"DEWEY."

On August 1, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote to Consul Williams as follows : ‡

"I am fully persuaded that the Filipinos will arrive at the height of happiness and glory if in future they can show with raised heads the rights which to-day are shown by the free

* Senate Document 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., page 345. Given in full in Pamphlet IV. of this series.

† Report of Rear Admiral Dewey for 1898, page 57.

‡ Senate Document 208. Given in full in Pamphlet II. of this series.

citizens of North America. These islands will be in effect one of the richest and pleasantest countries of the globe if the capital and industry of North Americans come to develop the soil."

"I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not forget for a moment the favors we have received and are now receiving; but however great those favors may be, it is not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots.

"These say that if the object of the United States is to annex these islands, why not recognize the government established in them, in order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexation?

"Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the Filipino generals, and, uniting their forces, render the end more decisive?

"Is it intended, indeed, to carry out annexation against the wish of these people, distorting the legal sense of that word?"

Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Cadet Leonard R. Sargent, who with Admiral Dewey's sanction travelled extensively through the Island of Luzon, make the following statements in their official report: *

"Of the large number of officers, civil and military, and of the leading townspeople we have met, nearly every man has expressed in our presence his sentiment on this question [*Independence*]. It is universally the same. They all declare that they would accept nothing short of independence."

Further, "On one point they are united, however, viz.: that whatever our government may have done for them it has not gained the right to annex them."

* Senate Document 66, page 42, given in full in Pamphlet III. of this series.

The above quotations serve to show in general outlines the aspirations of at least a powerful faction of the Filipino people. Whether they were capable of realizing this ideal is another matter.

The purposes of our own government are less easily set forth. The following statements may tend to indicate our general position :

General Anderson says : *

“I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the first expeditionary forces left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had no reason to surmise.”

First indications of disposition on the part of the United States to hold the Philippines.

Major-General Wesley Merritt states† that he received “special instructions from the President, furnished me by the Honorable Secretary of War, under date of May 28, 1898,” and on the following page he says :

“As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would

* *North American Review*, for February, 1900, page 276.

† Report of Major-General Wesley Merritt in Report of Secretary of War for 1898, page 39.

not, until then, be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs."

Of course these instructions related to military occupation only, and did not indicate what our fixed policy was to be.

In the report of the conference between the treaty commissioners at Paris, held October 31, 1898, we find the following paragraph : *

"The American Commissioners, having been invited by the Spanish Commissioners at the last conference to present a proposition in regard to the Philippine Islands, beg to submit the following article on that subject :

"Spain hereby cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands."

The treaty of Paris as it was finally signed in Paris, December 10, 1898, contains the following : †

"ARTICLE III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line :

"The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000), within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty."

It also states : ‡

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."

Thus the treaty, when it should be ratified, was to give us full power in the Philippines, leaving to Congress the question of how that power should be used.

On December 24, General Otis makes the following statement § of "the purpose of the United States, which,

Philippine
Islands ceded
to the United
States.

* Senate Document 62, page 108.

† Ibid., page 4.

‡ Ibid., page 5.

§ Report of Major-General Otis for 1899, page 57.

having succeeded to all the rights of Spain in the Philippine Islands, under treaty stipulations following conquest in the Eastern and Western hemispheres, intends to establish among them an efficient and most stable form of government which shall fully protect them in all their private interests and liberties, in which they shall have representation, and which will secure for them increasing and abundant prosperity."

On December 29, the President's cablegram defining "the position and policy of our government toward these islands" was received by General Otis, and transmitted to General Miller, who later summarizes it as follows:*

President's
cablegram
defining the
policy of the
United States.

"Its more important statements are:

"1. That the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to forces of the United States, followed by the signing of the Treaty of Peace at Paris on the tenth instant, operate to give the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands to the United States.

"2. It authorizes and directs the military commander in the Philippines to extend, with all possible despatch, the military government heretofore maintained in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila to the whole of the Philippine group.

"3. It directs that the military government to be established among you shall be exerted for the security of persons and property of the people of the Island and for the conformation of their private rights and relations. It announces to you that the army does not come among you as invaders and conquerors, but as friends to establish and maintain a government which will accord to the people what is the heritage of all free peoples — the full measure of individual rights and liberty."

It is not our intention, here, to enter into a discussion of the merits of either our own or the Filipinos' purposes, but merely to indicate the radical difference between the two positions, and thus to prepare the way for an understanding of later events.

* Senate Document 208, page 54.

B. Insurgent Successes before the Fall of Manila.

On the 13th of August, 1898, the Spanish surrendered the city, harbor, and bay of Manila to the American forces. From May 1 to that date Admiral Dewey had been stationed in Manila Harbor, and the insurgents had invested the Spaniards on the land side.

General Otis says :*

“ For three and one half months Admiral Dewey with his squadron, and the insurgents on land, had kept Manila tightly bottled.”

Further : †

“ Their [*the insurgents*]’ army was continually successful against the small Spanish garrisons scattered throughout the islands, and they were beginning to acquire the belief that they were invincible.”

General Merritt says : ‡

“ The insurgent forces . . . were, at the time of my arrival, in considerable force, . . . had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish lines of detached works throughout their entire extent.”

Formin Jaudenes, Governor-General of the Spanish forces, writes, August 7, 1898, to the Major-General of the United States Army and to the Rear Admiral of the Navy, that he is “ surrounded by insurrectionary forces.” §

General Whittier says : ||

“ But every place had been taken from them [*the Spanish*] by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and occupation of the country in an able manner.”

* Otis Report for 1899, page 13.

† Ibid., page 15.

‡ Report of Major-General Wesley Merritt in Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, page 49.

§ Report of Rear Admiral George Dewey for 1898, page 61.

|| Senate Document 62, page 501.

General Anderson says: *

"We held Manila and Cavite; the rest of the island was held not by the Spaniards, but by the Filipinos. In the other islands, the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns."

As a result of the successes of the Filipinos against the Spanish forces the power of Spain seems to have been fatally crippled. On this point was submitted the following testimony before the Peace Commission of Paris, in August, 1898:

From Memorandum of F. W. V. Greene, U. S. V., made August 27, 1898.†

"The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them."

General
Greene says
Spain un-
able to
govern the
Philippines
if we surren-
dered them.

From Letter of J. F. Bell, Major of Engineers in charge, dated August 29, 1898.‡

"I have met no one cognizant of the conditions now existing in those islands and in Spain who believes that Spain can ever again bring the Philippine Islands under subjection to its government."

From Statement of Major-Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., October 4, 1898, before the United States Peace Commission at Paris.§

"MR. DAVIS. Do you think the Spanish would be able to reduce them? [*The Filipinos, in the event of our entire abandonment of the islands.*]

"GENERAL MERRITT. No, sir."

* "Our Rule in the Philippines," *North American Review*, February, 1900, page 281.

† Senate Document 62, page 374.

‡ *Ibid.*, page 383.

§ *Ibid.*, page 369.

Obviously, if Admiral Dewey had not destroyed the Spanish fleet, and then held guard in Manila Bay, the Filipinos could not have gained such marked victories. This the Filipinos admitted; but they felt that while our assistance entitled us to their gratitude, it did not entitle us to possession of the territory which they themselves had won from the Spanish forces; nor did they feel that Spain had a right to cede to us territory of which she no longer held actual possession.

Discussing this point, Ex-President Harrison says : *

“ Our title to the Philippines has been impeached by some upon the ground that Spain was not in possession when she conveyed them to us. It is a principle of private law that a deed of property adversely held is not good. If I have been ejected from a farm to which I claim title, and another is in possession under a claim of title, I must recover the possession before I can make a good conveyance. Otherwise I sell a lawsuit and not a farm, and that the law counts to be immoral. It has not been shown, however, that this principle has been incorporated into international law; and, if that could be shown, there would still be need to show that Spain had been effectively ousted.

“ It is very certain, I suppose, that if Great Britain had, during our Revolutionary struggle, concluded a treaty of cession of the colonies to France, we would have treated the cession as a nullity, and continued to fight for liberty against the French. No promises of liberal treatment by France would have appeased us.

“ But what has that to do with the Philippine question? There are so many points of difference. We were Anglo-Saxons. We were capable of self-government. And, after all, what we would have done under the conditions supposed, has no bearing upon the law of the case. It is not to be doubted that any international tribunal would affirm the completeness of our legal title to the Philippines.”

* *North American Review*, for January, 1901, page 3.

Whatever the merits of the case from the point of view of international law, from a Filipino point of view the greater part of the archipelago, except Manila, belonged at the time of the arrival of our troops to the native government then in force. This fact is of primary importance to an understanding of the feeling of injury that steadily increased among the Filipinos from the time of the landing of our forces until the final outbreak of hostilities.

C. Insurgent Concessions before the Fall of Manila.

Before Manila was taken by our troops the Filipino army had, at our request, and with apparent willingness, withdrawn from an important military position. General Merritt* outlines this proceeding before the Peace Commission at Paris as follows :

“In his [*Aguinaldo's*] letters to General Anderson, he speaks of concessions they made there in the occupation of lines. They did. I told General Greene — gave him the instructions — to try to get these positions by an amicable arrangement if possible, but, if necessary, to report the facts to me, and I should use force to secure them. At the time I went there I found we had no lines, no base upon which to approach Manila. The insurgents had their pickets in front of ours, and our main guard was in the rear of their main guard, and I gave General Greene orders to change that status, which he did, and purely by arrangement with the general of whom Major Bell speaks as being a very sensible fellow and a good fellow. It appears when the request was made of him, he corresponded with Aguinaldo and the latter agreed to it.”

General
Greene's suc-
cessful ar-
rangements
with insur-
gent general.

Another concession seems to be indicated by the following cables :

† “[Telegram.]

“CAMP DEWEY, near Manila, 8-10-'98.

“Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

“*Commanding Filipino Forces, Bacoor:*

“Will your Excellency consent to my occupation of the

* Senate Document 62, page 367.

† Senate Document 208, page 17.

intrenchment facing Blockhouse No. 14, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon? Our object is to place artillery to destroy the blockhouse. If you consent, please issue necessary orders to-night. I shall highly appreciate a prompt reply.

“THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
“*Brigadier-General Commanding Division.*”

* “[Telegram.]

BACOR, Aug. 10, 1898.

“Brig.-Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON, U. S. V.,
Camp Dewey:

“SIR, — Replying to your note of this date, in which you ask me the occupation by your troops of the intrenchments facing Blockhouse No. 14 only, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon, I have the pleasure to tell you that I [am] giving the necessary orders so that your troops may occupy the mentioned intrenchments, and my troops will pass to the immediate intrenchments or to any other place where they think convenient to intrench themselves.

“I remain, most respectfully yours,

“E. AGUINALDO.”

D. First Hints of Conflict.

When our generals entered Manila they had not informed the Filipino generals of their intention to do so. The orders given to our troops were that the insurgents should not be allowed to enter the city.

The following extract from a letter from Major-General Anderson to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, dated “Dec. 4, 1898,” furnishes us with a convenient summary of the situation :

1. General Anderson's Account.†

“I omitted to mention in my first report a matter that has since evolved a question of importance.

“Major-General Merritt's demand that Aguinaldo should

* Senate Document 208, page 17.

† Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, page 678.

not permit his insurgent forces to participate in our attack or enter the city had not been regarded, as several thousand armed Filipinos had forced their way into the Paco and Malate suburbs. On the north side of the Pasig River the Spaniards still held their lines and kept out the insurgents from that direction, but on the south side the conditions were critical. The insurgents were excited and hostile, because not only had we not invited them to co-operate, but had tried to prevent them from crossing the Spanish lines. It is even probable that some of the street-firing upon our troops came from the Filipinos who had established themselves in Paco.

“About 7 o'clock I received a message from the general commanding to get the insurgents out of the city, if I could possibly do so. The best I could do at that time was to segregate the insurgent detachments by interposing our troops and placing artillery to command their positions. It was feared that they would break loose and loot the city. It must be said, however, that they maintained good discipline, I telegraphed General Aguinaldo that night, demanding the withdrawal of his troops. I received an answer that he would send commissioners to meet me the next day. They came the next afternoon, and the negotiations which followed averted, for a time, a conflict between our forces and the insurgent Philippines.

Good discipline maintained by insurgent troops who forced their way into Manila.

“Very respectfully,

“THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

“*Major-General United States Volunteers,*

“*Commanding Second Division, Aug. 13, 1898.*”

The same story is told more at length in General Anderson's article in the *North American Review*, for February, 1900, from which we quote (page 279) :

“The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the Filipinos can, as already explained, be traced back to our refusal to recognize the political authority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with them arose from our refusal to let them co-operate with us. About nine o'clock on the

**Insurgents
forbidden to
enter Manila.**

evening of Aug. 12, I received from General Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to him at twenty minutes past ten that night. The Filipinos had made every preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front. Certainly they would not have given up part of their line to us unless they thought they were to fight with us. They, therefore, received General Merritt's interdict with anger and indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila as their capital, and Luzon as their country. Knowing that they would disregard any remonstrance on our part, I sent a battalion of North Dakota Volunteers to hold a bridge they would have to cross if they followed us into Manila when we made our assault on the next morning; but when the battle began they broke in by way of Santana and got into the city as soon as we did. After the white flag was raised and the firing ceased, it was found that fully four thousand armed insurgents had taken possession of Paco and part of Malata, two important suburbs on the south of the Pasig. To hold them within these limits and stop any attempt at looting, a cordon of troops was thrown around them. The situation was exceedingly critical. Our soldiers believed that the Filipinos had fired on them, and the Filipinos were almost beside themselves with rage and disappointment. The friendly relations we had with Generals Recati and Morial alone prevented a conflict then and there.

"At seven o'clock I received an order from General Merritt to remove the Filipinos from the city. Had we attempted to use force, we would have had to fight to carry out our orders. In that event, we would certainly have had a serious complication. With ten thousand men we would have had to guard thirteen thousand three hundred Spanish prisoners and to fight fourteen thousand Filipinos. I, therefore, took the responsibility of telegraphing Aguinaldo, who was at Bacoor, ten miles below, requesting him to withdraw his troops, and intimating that serious consequences would follow

if he did not do so. I received his answer at eleven, saying that a commission would come to me the next morning with full powers. Accordingly, the next day Señor Buencamino, Lagarde, Areneto, and Sandeco came to Division Headquarters in Manila, and stated that they were authorized to order the withdrawal of their troops, if we would promise to re-instate them in their present positions on our making peace with Spain. Thereupon, I took them over to General Merritt. Upon their repeating their demands, he told them he could not give such a pledge, but that they could rely upon the honor of the American people. The General then read to them the proclamation he intended to issue to the Filipino people. The commission then went back to Aguinaldo for further instructions. A member of the commission had brought me a letter from Aguinaldo, complaining that he had been harshly treated, and that his army had given up a part of their lines to us on the understanding that there was to be a co-operation between us in the future military movements. I showed this letter to General Merritt after the commission had withdrawn. He directed me to reply that, if Aguinaldo had been apparently harshly treated, it was from a military necessity, and that while we might recognize the justice of their insurrection, it was thought judicious to have only one army in Manila at one time.

Commission sent by Aguinaldo told apparent harsh treatment due to military necessity.

“On the 15th the commission returned with a paper containing ten unreasonable demands. There was an astonishing change from one very reasonable condition one day to ten aggressive demands the next. The change can only be accounted for on the theory that Aguinaldo and his counsellors plainly perceived, from General Merritt’s proclamation, that we intended to hold the Philippines under our military rule. Upon this they determined to obtain the best conditions for themselves at once. There was subsequently ample confirmation of this, from the fact that General Otis suppressed that part of the President’s letter (Dec. 24, 1898) to the Secretary of War, which directed our military forces to take possession of all the Philippine Islands by

Peace pre-
liminaries
signed at
Washington.

right of transfer from Spain and by right of conquest. Upon receiving their demands, I told them that their propositions could not be considered until their troops withdrew from the city limits, and a map was given them with a line of delineation traced upon it. I had the demands translated and laid before General Merritt. What actions he would have taken I do not know, but just at the time he received the cable message announcing the signing of the peace preliminaries at Washington. He took the message and the Filipino propositions to the flagship in the harbor for a consultation with Admiral Dewey. On his return, he directed me to return to Cavite and assume command of a district south of the Pasig.

“There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we refused their request to leave their military force with a good strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with Spain without a guarantee of their independence. From what was known of the situation, our Government was justified in not recognizing Aguinaldo's authority as a *de facto* government. For, even if it had been determined to recognize an independent Filipino government, it did not follow that we should recognize a self-appointed junta as constituting a government. On the other hand, the dicta of international law, that in war, the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants, — which the President made the basis of his instructions to General Merritt, — could only be made to apply to the Philippines by a very liberal construction.

“Was Luzon a conquered country? We held Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held, not by the Spaniards, but by the Filipinos. On the other islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns. At the time referred to, we could not claim to hold by pur-

chase, for we had not then received Spain's quit-claim deed to the Archipelago. Making allowance for difference of time, we took Manila almost to the hour when the peace preliminaries were signed in Washington. But, no matter when Manila was taken, it was unfortunate for us that we felt so bound by the meshes of diplomatic amenities as to permit Spain's insurgent subjects to levy war against us, and attack us when they felt fully prepared,—a philanthropic policy which had cost us many valuable lives.

“To return to the question of conciliation, one of Aguinaldo's Commission, who was subsequently a member of his cabinet, said to me: ‘Either we have a *de facto* government or we have not. If we have, why not recognize the fact? If not, why have you recognized us at all?’ This last remark referred to General Merritt's conceding them the control of the Manila water-works, and to General Otis's attempts to negotiate with them without committing himself.

“There were other causes of antagonism. Our soldiers, to get what they considered trophies, did a good deal of what the Filipinos considered looting. A number made debts which they did not find it convenient to pay. They called the natives ‘niggers,’ and often treated them with a good-natured condescension which exasperated the natives all the more because they feared to resent it.

Our soldiers did what Filipinos considered looting.

“Thus it happened that the common people, from at first hailing us as deliverers, got to regarding us as enemies.”

[NOTE:—In connection with General Anderson's closing paragraphs, readers are referred to General Otis's remark, on page 41 of his report, quoted page 79 below.]

2. Mr. Foreman's Account.

With regard to the conduct of our soldiers in the Philippines, it is interesting to note the opinion of John Foreman, the author of a book on the Philippine Islands, more quoted perhaps than any other book on the subject, with the exception of Professor Worcester's. Mr. Foreman was also a witness before the Peace Commissioners at Paris in August, 1898.

From "Will the United States Withdraw from the Philippines?"*

"It would appear that the United States Government entered upon the conquest of the Philippines under a misconception of many points.

"In this, their first attempt at colonial expansion, they might have advantageously studied our methods of bringing Asiatics to accept our rule and live in peaceful submission to it. To successfully achieve such an end two conquests must needs be made simultaneously, — the military and the moral. In the Philippines the latter was apparently either overlooked or not even thought of. The conduct of the boisterous, undisciplined individuals who formed a large percentage of the first volunteer contingents sent to Manila had had an ineffaceably demoralizing effect on the proletariat, and has inspired a feeling of horror and loathful contempt in the affluent and educated classes who guide the Philippine public opinion. From the outset it was a mistake to treat the Christian Philippine population like savages ignorant of western civilization, considering that there are thousands of Filipinos mentally equal to the invading forces, and comparable, in intellectual training, with the average middle-class Europeans. I would point out that the Philippine Christian population includes not only those of pure Malay descent, but a large admixture of sagacious Spanish and Chinese half-castes educated in the university and colleges of Manila, in Hongkong, Europe, and other places.

"Within a fortnight after the capitulation of Manila the drinking saloons had increased fourfold. According to the latest advices, there are at least twenty to one existing in the time of the Spaniards. Drunkenness, with its consequent evils, is rife all over the city among the new white population. The orgies of the new-comers, the incessant street brawls, the insults offered with impunity to natives of both sexes, the entry with violence into private houses by the soldiery, who maltreated the inmates and laid hands on what

"Mistake to treat Christian Philippine population like savages ignorant of Western civilization."

* *National Review*, September, 1900, page 56.

they chose, were hardly calculated to arouse in the natives admiration for their new masters. Brothels were absolutely prohibited under the Spanish rule, but since the evacuation there has been a great influx of women of ill fame, whilst native women have been pursued by lustful tormentors. During a certain period after the capitulation there was indiscriminate shooting, and no peaceable native's life was safe in the suburbs. Adventurers of all sorts and conditions have flocked to this centre of vice, where the sober native is not even spoken of as a man by many of the armed rank and file, but, by way of contempt, is called a yuyu.

"A few miles from Manila, the villages of Mandaloyan and Sant Ana were looted by the victors, much of the spoil being brought up to the capital and included in auction sales or sold to the Chinese. In Taal the houses of families, with whom I have been long acquainted, were ransacked, effects of little value, or too difficult to transport, being carelessly strewn about from sheer wantonness. And presumably no greater respect for private property was shown in the other numerous villages overrun by the invaders.

"I do not criticize the acts themselves, but I draw attention to the bad policy of their commission. I do not, for a moment, suggest that the United States governing classes approve of this state of things. It is due to a miscalculation, born of inexperience, to have supposed that the peaceful submission of a people so far advanced in civilization could be obtained under such circumstances. The silently observant citizen sums up the situation in his own mind, and finds nothing attractive in the new social disorder. He has a positive repugnance for inebriety and a contempt for the inebriate. Family attachment is, perhaps, more intense and more extended than in Europe, and the violation of a native's home or of a distant relation's is, with him, unpardonable. And, although he may not practise all the highest forms of social refinement himself, he not only admires them in others, but, imperceptibly to himself, he is influenced and subdued by them."

**Family
attachment
intense in
Philippines.**

The situation, then, during this period, was somewhat as follows: The Filipinos, aided by Dewey's victory, had driven the Spaniards from practically the whole Archipelago except the city of Manila, they had established a government of their own, and they looked upon the country as belonging both by nature and by right of conquest to them. We, upon the other hand, having destroyed the Spanish fleet and captured the city of Manila, and being in the process of acquiring by treaty the Spanish title to the whole country, regarded it as belonging to us. The situation was, therefore, critical.

Critical
situation.

The danger of an immediate conflict was made acute by the fact that the American troops held a part of the city of Manila while the Filipinos held the rest. Our volunteers and the insurgents were thus brought into close quarters and, as shown above, were guilty of acts that bred bad feeling on both sides, augmented, no doubt, by inevitable race prejudice. It was, therefore, necessary, if peace was to be maintained, to separate the two armies, and it is with this separation that the first two groups of letters are concerned.

II. THE INSURGENTS' WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CITY OF MANILA.

A. Correspondence between Major-General Merritt and Aguinaldo.

(From August 20 to 25.)

[*Outline.* Summary by General Merritt — Memorandum from Aguinaldo, stating his original conditions for the withdrawal from Manila — Letter from General Merritt in reply, agreeing to certain conditions; withdrawal must be from municipal limits and certain suburbs named — Letter from Aguinaldo, further conditions desired — Memorandum by General Merritt for Major Bell (secret service officer), various requests to Aguinaldo, in particular to turn on the water-supply — Order from Aguinaldo to turn on water — Letter from General Merritt demanding immediate withdrawal — Telegram from Aguinaldo, intention to investigate trouble between forces at Cavite — Telegram of thanks from General Merritt.]

*From Major-General Merritt's Report.**

“After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as military governor, I had direct written communication with General Aguinaldo on several occasions. He recognized my authority as military governor of the town of Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might dictate, but at the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters in this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact; but, notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated

* Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, page 54.

to know that to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement."

Proclamation Issued by General Merritt.

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
“Aug. 14, 1898.

“TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES:

“I. War has existed between the United States and Spain since April 21 of this year. Since that date you have witnessed the destruction, by an American fleet, of the Spanish naval power in these islands, the fall of the principal city, Manila, and its defences, and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to the forces of the United States.

United States
does not come
to wage war
upon
Filipinos.

“II. The commander of the United States force now in possession has instructions from his Government to assure the people that he has not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any part or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who by active aid or honest submission co-operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection.

“III. The government established among you by the United States is a government of military occupation.

[“*Summary of Omitted Parts*: Municipal laws shall remain in force, administered in same way as before occupation, in so far as compatible with purposes of military government.]

“IV. [*Summary*: Duties of provost-marshals.]

“V. [*Summary*: Open ports in Philippines.]

“VI. [*Summary*: Public buildings protected; custodians of such buildings allowed to issue suitable orders for care of buildings.]

“VII. The commanding general, in announcing the establishment of military government and in entering upon his duty as military governor in pursuance of his appointment as

* Report of the Secretary of War for 1898, page 58.

such by the Government of the United States, desires to assure the people that so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.

“WESLEY MERRITT,
“Major-General U. S. Army, Commanding.”

AGUINALDO'S CONDITIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL FROM
MANILA.

“NOTES TO GENERAL ANDERSON.*

“1. We concede the military disposition of the town of Manila always that there be understood by said town the jurisdiction of the old municipal limits or walled city and its suburbs, Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Hermita, Malate, and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao. Aguinaldo's
list of
suburbs.

“2. We concede the source of potable water, always that (i. e. on condition that) the ayuntamiento of Manila bear the cost of repairing the machinery and piping, and the current expenses of the machinery, such as coal and the pay of the working force. We will be responsible for order and security at that place.¹

“¹ Both the pumping station (at Santolan) and the reservoir (at San Juan del Monte) had been taken from the Spaniards by and were in the hands of the insurgents prior to our entry into Manila.” [Given as foot note in Sen. Doc.]

“3. We ask free navigation for the *Patria*, with entrance and exit to the River Pasig; and our products be admitted free of duty and free entrance to and departure from the city to all the Filipinos, the arms of our chiefs and officers being respected.

“4. The sacrifices that we have made in contribution to

* Senate Document 208, pages 19-25.

the siege and capture of Manila being notorious, it is just that we should have a part of the booty of war.

"5. We ask for our use that palace at Malacánan and the convents at Malate, Hermita, and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

Requests
made by
Filipinos.

"6. We ask that the civil offices of Manila be filled by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General Merritt should have need of the Filipinos we would be pleased that he concede to our President, Gen. Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the right of nominating those Filipinos who would be most energetic and apt. The jurisdiction of the authorities of Manila will not be recognized outside of the municipal radius (limits).

"7. The American forces cannot (will not be permitted to) approach nor pass through our military positions without permission of the respective commander, and all positions outside of the municipal limits shall be evacuated. Spaniards who pass through our lines without permission of the commander will be considered as spies.

"8. We ask the return of the arms of the 150 military (men) who were disarmed by American officers.

"9. All arrangements (negotiations) must be made in writing and ratified afterwards by both generals in chief.

"10. We are pleased, lastly, to be certain (to affirm) that our own commissions and petitions do not signify acknowledgment on our part of North American sovereignty in these islands any more (or longer) than the necessity of actual war (demands).

"NOTE OF EXPLANATION. This is presumably a memorandum drawn up and submitted to General Anderson by the commissioners (of Aguinaldo) mentioned in the preceding telegram.

“ HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC, AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 “*Manila, P. I., Aug 20, 1898.*

“ THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

“ SIR : The commanding general of the American forces has received a memorandum addressed to General Anderson, which purports to contain a statement of certain desires on the part of the Filipinos.

“ As most of them seem to be reasonable, it gives him much pleasure to say that he agrees to the following :

“ The forces of the Filipinos are to be withdrawn entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the old municipal limits or walled city and its suburbs Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiato Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, and Paco or San Fernando dilo (*sic*). The Filipinos will repair at once whatever may be needed in order that the water may be turned on to the city, and the expense of the repairs and the current expenses of the works will be paid by the city. The commander of the Filipinos agrees to be responsible for order and security at the pumping station.

Merritt
 claims no
 suburbs not
 named by
 Aguinaldo.

“ Permission for the free navigation of the *Patria* to entrance and exit of the port and river passage, and that country products for sale be admitted free of duty, is granted.

“ Free entrance and departure from the city for all Filipinos without arms is granted. Chiefs and officers of the Filipinos army may, as a matter of courtesy, wear their side arms, though this is deprecated as possibly leading to disturbance of quiet of city.

“ No pistols should be carried. The major-general having taken for his own use the palace at Manacanan, the request that it be turned over to the Filipinos cannot be granted, and the convents at Malate, Ermita and Pacos cannot be turned over and must be evacuated. The civil offices at Manila are being filled, and rapidly as possible by Americans, and the commanding general will be glad to receive recommendations

for appointments to office of such Filipinos as may be considered fitted for the duties of subordinate officers.

“American soldiers without arms are to be allowed to pass through the Filipinos’ positions outside of the city, just as the Filipinos without arms are permitted to enter the city.

“The return of the arms of the one hundred and fifty men will be granted by the general in immediate command.

“The opening of the water-works at once and the retirement of your soldiers from the position now occupied within the municipal jurisdiction will be sufficient notice on your part that everything is satisfactorily arranged on the terms of this letter.

“With the sincere hope that it may be speedily accomplished, I am, very respectfully,

“W. MERRITT,

“*Major-General Commanding.*

“NOTE OF EXPLANATION. I delivered this letter the day it was written, and was to verbally convey the contents of the memorandum which follows the answer thereto at the same time, but Aguinaldo was absent from his headquarters at the time the letter was delivered, and I did not mention the contents of the memorandum, except that portion relating to opening the water-works immediately. His associates claimed that General Aguinaldo had already ordered this done (and I feel certain that he had). They promised that it should be done at once, and sent a message to again order it done at once while I was there. I made an engagement to see General Aguinaldo at 11 a. m. the next day.

“J. F. BELL.

Aguinaldo's
associates
order water
supply
turned on.

“BAKOOR Aug, 21, 1898.

“THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE

“AMERICAN FORCES IN THE PACIFIC.

“SIR: The commanding general of the Philippine forces has been favored by your Excellency with a letter of the 28th instant, containing the conditions that you will accept from

the Filipinos, provided the latter abandon the posts that they now occupy within the suburbs of Manila. The aforesaid letter speaks of permission for the free navigation of the *Patria*, and as the Filipinos have no boat by that name, the undersigned takes the liberty of clearing up that point, as he considers it understood that the Filipinos desire the protection of American squadron for the free navigation of all their boats, and free entrance and exit in the ports that are in charge of the same.

“Moreover, in substitution for the conditions proposed (in a previous communication), which the aforesaid letter does not mention, the Filipinos desire to go on occupying that part of the suburbs of San Fernando de Dilao, or Paco, adjacent to the east side of the bridge, and creek of the same name, the undersigned answering for the foreign interests which exist in that district. They also desire that if, in consequence of the treaty of peace which may be concluded between the United States of America and Spain, the Philippines should continue under the domination of the latter, the American forces should give up all the suburbs to the Filipinos, in consideration of the co-operation lent by the latter in the capture of Manila.

In sub-
stitution for
previous con-
ditions Fili-
pinos desire
to occupy
Paco.

“With these conditions, and others which you have already accepted, in the before-mentioned letter, the undersigned promises, in the name of the Filipinos, to evacuate the positions they now hold in the suburbs, and the acceptance of the same on the part of your Excellency will be one proof more that you have in consideration the innumerable lives sacrificed in the siege of Manila, and that you are able to appreciate the unqualified friendship which he, the undersigned, will try to preserve at all costs.

“Very respectfully, yours,

“EMILIO AGUINALDO.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION. This answer was already prepared and was handed to me on my arrival at 11 a. m. Therefore it was prepared before the contents of the memorandum which follows was made known to Aguinaldo and his associates.

“MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR BELL.

“1. In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows:—

“(1) That if a meeting between himself and the commanding general here could be arranged, I would be very glad to meet him and have a talk with him upon the general situation.

“(2) That it is of the most importance to us that the water supply of the city should be at once turned on, as, the rainy season having suspended, it is important that the sewers be flushed and the city gotten in fair sanitary condition.

“(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave him *in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government.* [Italics are as in the Senate Document.]

General Merritt advises Aguinaldo to visit Washington.

“(4) That I agree with Mr. Williams, the consul, in thinking that it would be well for him and some of his leaders to visit Washington and represent the case to the American authorities. I feel sure that good would result from this course. However, it is not considered necessary.

“(5) It is my intention to depose the Spanish officials from all important positions hitherto held by them, and this already has been done to a considerable extent. I will be very glad to receive recommendations from him for Filipinos who are especially trustworthy, though I cannot agree to make any appointments in the immediate future. The American officers and men will be employed as far as is practicable in conducting the affairs of the municipality.

“(6) I expect daily a considerable accession to the forces which I now have here, and it is my design to lodge them in Cavite, provided room can there be found. In conclusion,

sincerely trust that there will be no friction in the future between our commands, and that the good feeling that we have made every attempt to foster will be encouraged by Aguinaldo and his chiefs. For myself and the officers and men under my command, I can say that we have conceived a high respect for the ability and qualities of the Filipinos, and if called upon by the Government to express an opinion, it will be to that effect.

WESLEY MERRITT,

“Major-General.”

“NOTE OF EXPLANATION. Aguinaldo told me to thank General M. for his kind offer and to say that just as soon as his health would permit of such a thing (he had been sick) he would send a staff officer to General M. to ascertain when it would be convenient to meet him. He had not sent the staff officer, as far as I know, when General M. left. Soon after General M.’s arrival, he sent a staff officer on board the *Newport* to arrange for an interview with him, but the General sent back word that he was exceedingly pressed by business just then, but as soon as he could he would send him word when he could see him.

“I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. meant to convey by the underscored [italicized] portion of this remark, but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had used to me, and I preferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite promise on this subject.

Filipinos try to obtain definite promise in writing.

“Without losing a moment you will proceed to open (start) the machinery of the water-works, being sorry that up to the present my orders have not been completed (fulfilled) for said object, and I expect that the present will be immediately completed (fulfilled).

"I inform you that this order will be carried to you by Majors Bement (engineer) and Bell, accompanied by an assistant, Mr. Infante, with the object of examining said machinery. "E. AGUINALDO.

"BACOR, *April 21*, 1898.

"NOTE OF EXPLANATION. Aguinaldo and his associates seemed much gratified when I made known to them the contents of the preceding memorandum. I asked for a written order to the officers in charge of the forces holding the reservoir and pumping station, to be delivered by myself. The above was prepared and handed to me. Captain Infante, one of Aguinaldo's adjutants, was also sent with me to make sure his object (the immediate opening of the works) was accomplished. On arriving at the pumping station next day I found that the delay had been due not to official obstruction, but to the inability of these *mañana* people to overcome the inertia incident to starting up machinery which had lain idle for some months.

Delay in
water supply
not due to
official
obstruction.

"*Manila, Aug. 24*, 1898.

"OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR AND

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

"General EMILIO AGUINALDO,

"*Bakoor, P. I.*

"SIR, — The commanding general of the American land forces has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 21, and in reply to inform you as follows :

"The error which you speak of which needs clearing up as to the navigation of the *Patria* seems to have arisen from a request on your part that the Filipinos of the country should be permitted to trade freely and navigate without obstruction the streams and bays surrounding Manila. So far as the products of the country are concerned this has been acceded to, and there will be no obstruction placed by the American land forces in the way of a free trade in the products of the

country between the residents of this island and the city of Manila.

“ The protection which you ask from the American squadron rests with Rear-Admiral Dewey, and it is for him to determine whether it can be granted or not.

“ A commission of your appointment which had an interview with the undersigned about the 15th instant agreed that if a line were designated by a proper commission on my part that the armed Filipinos should retire beyond it. While this has been done in some instances it has been neglected in others, and it is now desired to call your attention to the fact that the occupation of the suburbs of Manila or any part of them cannot be acceded to by the undersigned. It has already been pointed out to you that the dual occupation of Manila was impossible in the interests of either party ; and as the troops of the United States are in possession of Manila I must insist upon carrying out the original agreement between your commission and myself. I am the more insistent in this particular because recent instructions from my home government contemplate this course.

Suburbs of
Manila can-
not be oc-
cupied by
insurgents.

“ So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me, as a military representative only of the United States, to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here and the Government, of which you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the future.

“ This answer to your communication has been delayed by a press of business which could not very well be neglected.

“ I thank you in the name of my country for the good will expressed toward it, and feel assured that nothing will occur to mar the friendly feeling that now exists. It is for the interests of all that the good feeling that now exists between us should be carefully fostered and maintained.

“ Very respectfully, WESLEY MERRITT,

“ *Major-General.*

"[*Telegram received from Aguinaldo, 5.13 a. m., Aug. 25, 1898.*]

"General MERRITT :

"Concerning trouble between Philippine and American forces at Cavite, I have received notice of the death of 1 American soldier and 3 wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. They fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among themselves. General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on account of which I have ordered investigations to ascertain the truth and demonstrate that the Filipinos try to be in harmony with the Americans. If I shall find any one of my people guilty, I shall order severe punishment.

"Yours, respectfully,

"AGUINALDO.

"[*Reply to telegram received from Aguinaldo, 5.13 a. m. Aug. 25, 1898.*]

"[*Telegram.*]

"MALACANAN, *August 25, 1898, — 8.05 a. m.*

"General AGUINALDO,

"*Commanding Philippine Forces, Bakoar :*

"Thanks for your telegram. I am glad to learn of your intention to investigate fully. I am desirous with you that harmony should prevail, and request you always, in event of trouble, to communicate directly with me, as you have so wisely done this time.

"MERRITT."

Aguinaldo
orders inves-
tigation of
trouble be-
tween forces.

B. Correspondence Between Aguinaldo and Major-General Otis.*

(From August 27 to September 15.)

[*Outline*: Summary from General Otis's report — Letter from Aguinaldo, no obligation to withdraw until conditions are accepted — Letter from Otis, threatening use of force — A commission from Aguinaldo requests Otis to substitute for this threat a simple request — Letter from Otis to Aguinaldo, expressing a simple request for withdrawal — Reply from Aguinaldo, appropriate orders have been given — Insurgents withdrawn September 15.]

“ The insurgent forces, commanded by General Aguinaldo, entered the city with our troops on August 13, and actively held joint occupation with them over a considerable part of the southern portion of the same, declining to vacate on the plea, first, that they had served as allies with our troops, during the operations which had preceded the taking of the city, and therefore had the right to participate in the victory ; and, secondly, that they wished to maintain all advantageous positions secured in order to resist successfully the troops of Spain, should that government be permitted to resume its former power over the islands. **Filipinos claim right to hold joint occupation.** Brigadier-Generals Anderson and MacArthur were exercising immediate command of the troops, — the former at Cavite and vicinity, where a small contingent was stationed, and the latter at Manila, where the great majority had been judiciously placed in barracks and other available buildings. General MacArthur also, as provost marshal-general, had charge of the police of that city and supervision of about thirteen thousand prisoners, Spanish and native, who had been surrendered by the Spanish authorities. These had been collected in the walled portion

* From the Report of Major-General Otis for 1899, pages 4 to 10. General Otis, as there stated, “relieved Major-General Merritt of the command of the Department of the Pacific and as Military Governor of the Philippine Islands,” on August 29, 1898, and consequently took up from that date the correspondence with Aguinaldo.

of the city and occupied, for the most part, its churches and convents. Outwardly peace reigned, but the insurgents, disappointed because not permitted to enjoy the spoils of war, in accordance with medieval customs, and to exercise with the United States joint control of municipal affairs, were not friendly disposed, and endeavored to obtain their asserted rights and privileges through controversy and negotiations and a stubborn holding of the positions taken by their troops. This manifestation caused General Merritt to cable the authorities at Washington, on August 14, as follows :

“Since occupation of town and suburbs, the insurgents on outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of the city. Inform at once how far I shall proceed in enforcing obedience of insurgents in this matter and others that may arise, etc.

“To which he received reply, dated August 18, that there must be no joint occupation of the city, bay, and harbor with the insurgents, that they and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities, proclaimed by the President. Some correspondence between General Merritt and Aguinaldo preceded and followed this dispatch, and I believe also two or three other discussions of the subject between the representatives of Aguinaldo and General Merritt’s subordinate officers, all of which have been reported. Upon leaving the island, General Merritt’s chief of staff turned over to me a communication from General Aguinaldo, and in letter transmitting it said :

“Enclosed you will find a letter from General Aguinaldo, and a blue print of Manila. The letter was brought by his aid two days ago, and was informed that a reply would be sent within four days. The matter should have immediate attention, as General Merritt has not been able to take it up, owing to his hurried departure. The letters referred to by Aguinaldo, by General Merritt, will be found in the press copy-book at the Department Headquarters and here.

“The demand now made by Aguinaldo is to retain his

Home
authorities
cable that
there must
be no joint
occupation of
Manila.

people just outside of the interior black pencil mark on the map. The outside pencil marks indicate the position that General Merritt has desired to have the insurgents withdraw to. I inferred from what the aid said that what Aguinaldo particularly desires is that in case his requests are not granted that reasons are to be given which he can use to satisfy his people. The trouble with him seems to be that he does not think it prudent to give positive orders for his people to withdraw from the city.

Aguinaldo asks reasons which shall satisfy his people.

“The communication turned over read as follows :

“ REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
 “ *Presidencia Bakoar, August 27, 1898.*

“ Gen. WESLEY MERRITT, *Manila* :

“ MY DEAR SIR: Knowing the contents of your letter of the 24th instant, I cannot do less than manifest my surprise at knowing that you had formed the idea that my commissioners compromised themselves in the conference of the 15th, to retire my troops outside the line that you would designate.

“ I understood, and still understand, as well as the commissioners, that the evacuation by my troops of the posts that they occupy to-day on the outskirts of the city, would take place when the proposed conditions were accepted by you, among which figured the condition that the agreement (treaty) should be in writing to be valid ; for which reason, not yet having accepted some of the propositions made at that time, nor those which were substituted in my previous communication, I do not think that up to the present time I have contracted said obligation.

“ If I have permitted the use of the waters before the promulgation of the treaty, it was more to demonstrate that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything that does not prejudice too much the rights of the Philippines. I comprehend, as well as yourself, the inconvenience of a dual occupation of the city of Manila and its suburbs, given in the conditions stipulated in the capitulation with the

Spaniards; but you ought to understand that without the long siege sustained by my forces, you might have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never the rendition of the Spanish forces, who could have retired to the interior towns.

“I do not complain of the disowning of our help in the mentioned capitulation, although justice resents it greatly, and I have to bear the well-founded blame of my people. I do not insist on the retention of all the position conquered by my forces within the city limits, at the cost of much blood, of indescribable fatigues, and much money. I promise to retire, then, to the following line :

“In Malate, the continuation of the calzada of Singalon to the bridge that joins said road ; from this bridge in straight line to that of Paco ; from this last bridge, following the creek Paco, and leaving outside the suburb Tandue, to the River Pasig ; following this river and entering by the creek that goes to the bridge of Aviles ; from this bridge, following the road (calzada) of the same name and that of Santa Mesa, that are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the village of Pandacan, to the jurisdictional limit of the suburbs of Sampaloc, Trozo, and Tondo.

“But before I retire to this line, I pray you to reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships for free navigation, and permit me to insist, if you will, upon the restitution of the positions that we are now going to leave, if in the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the United States, they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines. I expect as well that you order the American forces outside of above line to retire within the city, as already agreed to.

“I do not believe that the acceptation of the conditions proposed will prejudice the smallest right of your people, as it signifies nothing more than the acknowledgment of a part of the rights of a friendly people.

“I am compelled to insist on the said conditions to quiet the complaints of my chiefs and soldiers who have exposed

Line suggested by Aguinaldo to which insurgents shall withdraw.

their lives and abandoned their interest during the siege of Manila.

“ I hope that this time you will manifest the spirit of justice that pertains to such a free and admirably constituted government as that of the United States of America.

“ Yours, very respectfully,

“ EMILIO AGUINALDO.”

[*Summary of Omissions*: Telegram, Otis to Aguinaldo, August 31, 1898, asking for time to consider situation — Aguinaldo to Otis, August 31, 1898, continuance of friendly relations — Otis to Aguinaldo, September 8, 1898. At the conference of August 15, concessions were made only in return for certain expected privileges, and there has not been an agreement in these matters, so that no obligations have arisen. I note with pleasure your friendly acts. The occupation of Manila involved mandatory conditions. The city was surrendered to the United States forces, who assumed all the incident responsibilities. There is neither justice nor equity in a joint occupation, nor would such a thing be practicable. Your claim to a share of the booty is made under the mistake that the United States Government recognizes the system of looting. Your shipping will be protected like any other shipping. Neither in law nor in morals can we accede to your request to turn over certain portions of Manila to your troops. My Government has specially enjoined me to allow no joint occupation. I have not been instructed as to what course the United States intends to pursue here. Any conflict between our forces would be regrettable, and as it could tend only to excite the citizens of my powerful country, your armed forces must evacuate the entire city at once, or I shall be obliged to use force and hold you responsible for the consequences. Admiral Dewey concurs with me in all respects.]

“ On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating

Commission sent by Aguinaldo to discuss Otis's threat of force.

that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated — something which he could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters — he would probably be able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following :

“OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
 “ *Manila, P. I., September 13, 1898.*

“THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

“SIR: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have the honor to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen, who are in the interests of your revolutionary government, upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed at length the complications now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops continue to occupy jointly the certain districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations which have always been maintained by and between them and the forces of the United States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

“It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual

General Otis's
 letter re-
 questing
 withdrawal.

amicable relations be continued; that they be not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of yourself and associates.

“May I ask, therefore, that you remove your troops from Manila?”

“Permit me to add, in conclusion, that I have that confidence in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request.

“I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

“E. S. OTIS,

“*Major-General U. S. V.,*

“*United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*

“In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:

“MALOLOS, BULACAN, *September 16, 1898.*

“THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.

“MY DEAR SIR: Referring to your esteemed communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the honor to inform you that I have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to points where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict.

“I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people. Mutual desire to preserve amicable relations.

“A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for not having answered with the promptness desired.

“Your very respectful servant,

“EMILIO AGUINALDO.

“On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district. This, certain agents of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short time, on the plea that the general officer in command would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops.”

Withdrawal
of insurgents
adroitly
effected.

III. THE INSURGENTS' WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SUBURBS.

[*Outline:* Letter from General Anderson complaining of hostile act—Letter from General Otis requesting more extended withdrawal of insurgents—Letter from Aguinaldo, Filipinos will retire from all but Pandacan, desire extension of time—Interview between Otis and emissaries from Aguinaldo, who request block-houses be left in their hands—Letter from Aguinaldo again requesting that Pandacan, not being a suburb, nor included by General Merritt in list of positions to be vacated, be left in hands of insurgents—Insurgent troops withdrawn October 25.]

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL OTIS AND AGUINALDO.*

(From October 10 to 25.)

“In a former portion of this report I stated the fact that the insurgent authorities had received permission to continue in occupancy of certain suburbs of the city for a short time when they, on September 15th, withdrew their troops from its interior portions. They did not subsequently remove their troops in accordance with agreement, but appeared to be determined to retain Pandacan, as they believed them to be advantageous military positions, south of the Pasig River. The assertion was made, and became current, that these suburbs were not within the jurisdiction of Manila, and it became advisable to make search and survey to gain desired information on that point. These were made by Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, chief engineer of the corps.

Insurgents permitted to occupy certain suburbs for a short time.

“The survey showed that the city had never been correctly mapped, especially as concerned the trend of the Pasig River in the lines of the outlying districts. The best opinion did not consider the suburbs, still occupied by the insurgent troops, beyond city limits, but no decree could be found which fixed their political status. These troops had given

* Otis Report, pages 15-20.

great annoyance. Their officers had exhorted contributions from the citizens of Manila, some of whom they had kidnapped and carried away. They had placed guards upon the river bank and in many instances refused to permit our officers to pass their lines, although a mutual agreement had been made which permitted the individual members of both armies when unarmed to pass and repass all military lines without hindrance. A number of reports were submitted of insurgent interference in this respect. General Anderson called at my quarters on October 9, and complained of the indignity he had received at the hands of the insurgents in not being permitted to proceed up the river to the insurgent lines, and was thereupon informed that, as soon as a certain map or survey could be completed, General Aguinaldo would be directed to remove his troops from Paco. On the following day he submitted the following official complaint :

“ HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 “ *Cavite Arsenal, P. I., Oct. 10, 1898.*

“ THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
 “ *Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps,*
 “ *Manila, P. I.*

“ SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, the 9th instant, while proceeding up the Pasig River, on the steam launch *Canacao*, with three officers of my staff, the American flag flying over the boat, I was stopped by an armed Filipino guard and informed that we could go no farther. Explaining that we were an unarmed party of American officers out upon an excursion, we were informed that, by orders given two days before, no Americans, armed or unarmed, were allowed to pass up the Pasig River without a special permit from President Aguinaldo.

“ I demanded to see the written order and it was brought and shown me. It was an official letter signed by Pio del Pilar, division general, written in Tagalo and stamped with what appeared to be an official seal. It purported to be issued by the authority of the President of the Revolutionary Govern-

General
 Anderson
 complains of
 indignity at
 hands of
 insurgents.

ment, and forbade Americans, either armed or unarmed, from passing up the Pasig River. It was signed by Pilar himself.

“As this is a distinctly hostile act, I beg leave to ask how far we are to submit to this kind of interference.

“It is respectfully submitted that whether this act of Pilar was authorized or not by the assumed insurgent government, it should, in any event, be resented.

“Very respectfully,

“THOMAS H. ANDERSON,

“*Major-General U. S. V., Commanding Division.*

“As soon as the complete map or survey of the city could be blue printed, a communication was prepared and taken by one of my aids to Malolos. An allusion was made therein to General Aguinaldo's letter of September 16, in which he informed me of his action of the previous day in withdrawing troops in consonance with my former request which did not at the time require a reply. The communication was as follows :

Map of
Manila blue-
printed.

“OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR,

“*Manila, P. I., Oct. 14, 1898.*

“GEN. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

“*Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces,*

“*Malolos, P. I.*

“GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 16th ultimo, and beg to apologize for the late official recognition of the same, presenting as a reason for my delay the necessity of obtaining certain information in order to arrive at conclusions in matters materially affecting the substance of our late correspondence, the securing of which had been attended with great difficulty.

“I fully appreciate the friendly spirit manifested towards my government in your expressions of regard, which your action in retiring your troops has confirmed, but I believe there has existed, and still exists, some misunderstanding as to the limits of territory, which that government is compelled

to occupy and administer under its international obligations with Spain, the responsibility for which it cannot escape.

“The articles of capitulation transferred the city of Manila, its suburbs, and all defences, as I had the honor to inform you in my letter of September 8. It was found impossible to determine definitely, on any existing map, either the limits of the city or the lines of its defences. The latter had been variously placed at some points retired, and at others thrust out beyond the conceded city limits. I therefore directed my chief engineer, by a careful search of the municipal records, and an actual survey, to ascertain the lines within which occupation by United States troops was obligatory by reason of the terms of the surrender. He has finally concluded these directed labors, and has presented a map, of which the enclosed blue print is a copy, on which is traced in white the lines determined upon. By reference to this print and a comparison of the same with all former existing maps of the city and suburbs, it will be perceived that the latter vary materially from it, especially as to the trend of the Pasig River and the location of the Spanish defences. The lines of circumvallation on the print begin at the Bocana de Vitas, and thence they follow Maypajo Creek until they reach the line of the Lico road produced; thence proceed along said line and road to Lico; thence to the junction of the two roads in front of the Chinese hospital; thence along the road in front of said hospital to the north corner of the hospital wall; thence to blockhouse No. 4; thence by blockhouses Nos. 5, 6, and 7, to San Juan del Monte Creek, at the aqueduct; thence down said creek and up the Rio Pasig to the mouth of Concordia Creek; thence by Concordia and Tripa de Galinas creeks, to a point opposite the place where the road from Cingalon to Pineda (Pasai) turns sharply to the right; thence by road to Maitubig, and thence to the mouth of Malate Creek. This map is believed to be correct, as the surveying and platting were executed with the greatest care and with a desire for accuracy. The lines do not include all of the territory which the late Spanish chief engineer of this

General
Otis's map
unlike all
other maps.

city has described as lying within its suburbs, and a larger proportion of them are drawn within the lines of the city's defences; but they are practical, and include all portions of the suburbs which my government, under its promises to Spain, could be expected to hold possession of under any demands which Spain might present.

"In your withdrawal of troops I note that to the north they retired to the lines described on the map furnished by my predecessor, General Merritt, while to the east and south his request was not observed. As far as Paco is concerned, it was understood that the troops in that section would be withdrawn within a short period of time, and I have now the honor to represent that the retention of that mutually conceded suburb has been a source of great annoyance to the American authorities, and, as I fully believe to yourself, while the revolutionary forces along the Cingalon and connecting roads have been the cause of complaint from the inhabitants of that section.

"I am, therefore, compelled by reason of my instructions, which direct me to execute faithfully the articles of the Spanish capitulation, because of the interests of my Government and, as I sincerely believe, the welfare of your own forces, to ask that you withdraw all your troops beyond the lines marked in the accompanying blue print which are above described, and I must request such withdrawal on or before the 20th instant, else I shall be forced into some action looking to that end.

"Permit me in conclusion, General, to bring to your attention facts of which you are doubtless ignorant, and which all connected with the American authorities, especially that vast majority who have entertained a decided and pronounced friendly interest in the Philippine people, have viewed with more or less indignation. In a number of instances kidnapping and robbery have been committed recently within the city by parties who claimed to be connected with your forces, some of whom stated that they were acting under your instructions. This I cannot believe; but the high-handed offences committed by these persons show how important it

Insurgents must withdraw beyond lines marked on map.

is, for the interests of all concerned, to withdraw your troops as herein requested. In numerous instances my officers have submitted complaints to me that they have been arrested and compelled to turn back to the city, though journeying as unarmed and peaceful citizens merely with the intent to seek health and recreation; and on Sunday last a funeral party from the British warship *Powerful*, now lying within this harbor, was so delayed by the insurgent forces at Paco, when proceeding to its English cemetery, that it was returned to its vessel and repeated the journey the following day. I fail to see how such proceedings can be justified before enlightened public opinion, and it is a matter of profound surprise to me that people seeking relief from the control of a government, by which in the pronounced judgment of a large portion of the civilized world, it has been oppressed for centuries, should permit its armed authorities to so conduct themselves as to arouse the indignation of friendly and assistant nations. The indignities which my Government has suffered from the revolutionary forces still illegally maintained at Paco (few of them are cited herein) cannot be tolerated in the future. Resistance to the high-handed proceedings there committed is not merely considered a duty from which there is no escape, but would be esteemed a virtue by any civilized government cognizant of the facts. I do not for a moment permit myself to entertain the impression that either you or the able advisers by whom you are surrounded, have authorized these insults to my government, but I must bring them to the notice of the authorities which maintain these troops, and upon which rests the legal responsibility for their conduct.

“There is another matter* which I beg respectfully to present to your distinguished consideration. There are a great number of United States soldiers within this city, and a large accession primarily intended and equipped by my Government for use against the armed forces of Spain, is en route for this port. The continued unhealthfulness of the

Otis com-
plains of in-
dignities suf-
fered at
hands of revo-
lutionary
forces.

* Cf. Section III. “Convalescent Camp.”

city, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts we are making for a thorough police of the same, may make it necessary to temporarily encamp such troops as are suffering from diseases contracted here, on some point of land which promises favorable sanitary conditions for restoration of health.

“Should the emergency become imminent, the dictates of humanity and the overwhelming demands of my Government would oblige me to establish a convalescent camp in this locality, to which troops could be sent for recuperation, and to relieve the congested situation which must attend the presence of so large a body of armed men within a thickly populated city. I have in mind for this possible camp the grounds on the shore of the bay formerly occupied by the United States troops and designated Camp Dewey, or the high ground to the east of the city. It is my desire to place it at a locality which would not inconvenience any organization connected with your forces or the surrounding inhabitants, and to the emergency of this anticipated proceeding I respectfully invite your consideration and ask your assistance should execution become necessary. Should action of this character be decided upon, I beg of you to rest firmly in my unqualified assurances that it will be undertaken in a spirit of friendliness and with the sincere desire to neither compromise nor affect in the slightest degree your interests and those of the people whom you represent, but, on the contrary, to enhance them.

**United States
desires to
respect the
interests of
the Filipinos.**

“Permit me to inscribe myself, General, with the highest respect,

“Your most obedient servant,

“E. S. OTIS, *Major-General, U. S. V.*,

“*United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*

“On the 18th of October three accredited representatives from Aguinaldo called, and the chairman, Dr. Tavera, a member of the Malolos cabinet, presented a note, of which the following is a copy :

“MANILA, Oct. 18, 1899.*

“His Excellency Major-General OTIS,

“*Military Governor of the United States Forces*
“*in the Philippines:*

“GENERAL: I have the honor to place in your hands this note, which I bring personally, in which I make known the object of the mission confided to me by President Aguinaldo, which I will reiterate verbally. The letter dated the 14th of this month which you directed to General Aguinaldo, reached his hands, and, desirous of complying with your desires, he called in council all his generals and made known to them the desires which you expressed in your letter.

“Highly appreciating the spirit of friendship and good feeling which is constantly noted in your honorable letters, and which reflects the sentiments of Americans and their policy toward us, the generals of Mr. Aguinaldo cheerfully acceded to that which you ask.

“But the idea of the possibility that Spain may return to this territory and occupy Manila as a result of the decision of the Americo-Spanish conference now in session in Paris, has caused said general to try and obtain a modification of the demands which you express in your letter of the 14th.

“Having verbally explained, for your consideration, the reasons which influence the manner of thought of the Philippine generals, I shall make also the following propositions, made by President Aguinaldo:

“First. The Filipinos will retire beyond the line of demarcation indicated in the blue print as you desire.

“Second. The Filipinos will retain Pandacan under their jurisdiction.

“Third. The Filipinos consider it of the greatest importance to occupy the blockhouses, with their forces in line, in view of the possible return of the Spanish, promising not to pass with arms.

Filipinos
wish to
retain
Pandacan.

* Evident misprint for 1898.

“Fourth. General Aguinaldo asks of you an extension of the time indicated for evacuation of his troops.

“I repeat, sir, with the greatest consideration and respect,

“T. H. PARDO DE TAVERA.

“Considerable discussion followed and Tavera, a man of excellent scientific and professional attainments, long a resident of Paris and educated there, and who had advocated openly the establishment of American sovereignty in the islands as necessary to the welfare of the inhabitants, ably represented his chief, strongly urging the concessions requested in his communication. It developed that my letter of the 14th had aroused fierce opposition; that Aguinaldo had indignantly disclaimed any knowledge of the promise to gradually withdraw the troops from Paco and Pandacan, and that opinion on the question to withdraw or fight, which the insurgent leaders had discussed, was well-nigh equally divided. All the concessions requested were denied. Then an extension of the date fixed in my letter, upon which the insurgent troops must be retired, to October 25, was asked for and granted. In the course of our conversation Dr. Tavera and his associates strongly urged permission to retain all the Spanish blockhouses, but were informed that we could not yield in this matter, as some of them were within the lines beyond which they must withdraw. They then reverted to the blockhouses northeast of the city, which were on those lines, saying that they had no shelter for their troops if they were taken from them, and I remarked casually that I did not consider them of any importance, as we did not intend to occupy them, but that I was unable to concede the point. It seems, however, that I was misunderstood in this matter, and the committee reported to Aguinaldo that these blockhouses would remain in his possession. When, six days later, after I had corrected this mistaken impression, Dr. Tavera called upon me in person and explained the most unfortunate position in which he had been placed by reason of this misunderstanding, I informed him that I would not take imme-

Filipinos
wish to retain
Spanish
blockhouses.

diate action even if the insurgents did not vacate these houses on the date announced. All this appears in subsequent correspondence.

"On October 20 it was reported that the insurgent troops were moving southward by railway from Malolos and other points and were being concentrated near the north line of the city. On calling the attention of the insurgent authorities to this threatening demonstration the concentration ceased and many of the troops were removed.

"On October 23, the following was received :

"REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
"Presidency, *Malolos, October 22, 1898.*

"General E. S. OTIS,

"Commander in Chief of the American Forces, Manila, P. I.

"GENERAL: In view of your favor of the 14th instant, I consulted the opinions of my generals and advisory council, and I have appointed Dr. Pardo de Tavera in order that he might place before you the wishes of all, as he did on the 18th. Said commissioners, without giving me an account of your wishes, told me that you had consented to postpone the ultimatum for the withdrawal of our troops until the 25th, and the retention by our forces of the blockhouses situated on the line shown on the blue map which you sent me with said letter, but had not acceded to the desires of the Philippine people that my forces continue to occupy Pandacan. Relative to the latter point, I take the liberty of telling you that your predecessor, General Merritt,* understood that the American forces only ought to occupy, according to the terms of the capitulation of Manila, the city and its environs, *i. e.*, Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando de Dilao, and thus he clearly puts it in his letter of August 20, last. The town of Pandacan has always been considered outside of the old municipal limits of Manila, which the general himself mentions in said letter, and I hope your high sense of judgment will see it thus.

* See letter from General Merritt reprinted on page 29 of this pamphlet.

General Merritt did not include Pandacan as a suburb.

“Nevertheless, I understand that your forces are already occupying the Uli-Uli, Nactahan, and Santa Mesa districts, which, although belonging to the jurisdiction of Pandacan, they can continue to do, in order to prevent the continual encounters with mine which cause disagreeable incidents.

“I take pleasure in manifesting to you that it is not lack of confidence, and much less animosity, that prompts me to write in this manner. To-day, more than ever, the Filipinos desire to live in peace and perfect harmony with the Americans, because they will take care that the Philippines do not return under the odious Spanish dominion. When it is possible for a formal convention to pacify and harmonize the interests of the two peoples, then the suspicions of my people, — which I cannot completely quiet with my prestige and authority, no matter what good desires move me, — will disappear.

**Aguinaldo
desires con-
vention to
harmonize
the interests
of the two
people.**

“I beg of you not to consider as an insult to your flag a bad interpretation of my orders, which I will severely punish according to the gravity of the offence. You, with your keen perception, will understand that a people agitated by a revolution, return gradually, not suddenly, to their normal life, no matter how educated they are supposed to be. It becomes necessary for me to act with much tact in order to give no cause for internal dissensions.

“And this consideration is what obliges me to ask you about the form and condition with which you wish to establish a sanitarium* within my lines ; because I wish, at all costs to prevent the possibility of your complaints being renewed concerning acts emanating from the continual contact of our forces. I understand that you have considered it necessary to demand the withdrawal of our forces, notwithstanding the friendship which binds us, in order to prevent friction. On this account, although I highly appreciate the humane sentiments which prompt you, I do not dare allow it, without previous explanation, for the very reason that I wish to pre-

* Cf. Section III. “Convalescent Camp.”

serve the friendship that constitutes the welfare of both people.

“ I hope you will pardon me, as the necessity of consulting various advisers has obliged me to delay my answer.

“ I am, General, with the greatest consideration, your obedient servant,

“ EMILIO AGUINALDO.

“The representatives of Aguinaldo, who presented this communication, came prepared to argue its merits, and after considerable conversation, I sent the oral reply that the subject had been exhaustively discussed, and that General Aguinaldo must withdraw his troops from the lines designated, on or before the date announced, remarking at the time that I would make formal reply later to certain points which he had presented in his note.

“The insurgent troops were withdrawn on the afternoon and evening of October 25, as promised, and on October 27, the following letter * was sent to Malolos, and brought out those of November 4* and 16,* which hereinafter appear. These terminated all official correspondence upon the subjects herein discussed.”

**Insurgent
troops
withdrawn.**

* See next Section.

IV. CONVALESCENT CAMP.*

[*Outline*: Letter from Otis; he considers Pandacan a suburb, in spite of General Merritt's omission and vague Spanish decrees; a place is wanted for a convalescent camp — Letter from Aguinaldo, before land for convalescent camp is ceded requests fixed basis of arrangements — Letter from Otis, camp may not be necessary.]

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL OTIS AND AGUINALDO.†

(From October 27 to November 2.)

“OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., Oct. 27, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

“*Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.*

“GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 22d instant, and have awaited the result of our correspondence and conferences upon the subject of which you treat.

“Concerning the conference of the 18th instant with your representative, Dr. Pardo de Tavera, it resulted in an honest misunderstanding between us in one slight particular only. The doctor, very ably, by letter, submitted your wishes, one of which was the retention of the blockhouses on the designated line. In regard to this matter, I said I was powerless to make any concessions, and in the conversation which followed remarked, in substance, through the interpreter, that we did not wish to occupy them, as we did not consider them of any importance. The doctor, I can conceive, very naturally misunderstood my meaning — in fact, the interpreter might have done so — and when, on the 24th instant, the doctor again called and forcibly expressed his construction of my language, I was so impressed with his earnestness and

**Dr. Tavera
misunder-
stood General
Otis's state-
ment.**

* Cf. Extracts, pages 50 and 55.

† Otis Report, pages 20-22.

honesty of purpose and convictions, I remarked that, although the law would not permit a concession, I would not raise any objection, unless hereafter compelled to do so by my superior authority, if your forces continued to occupy the blockhouses to the north of the Pasig River.

Otis finds
that Merritt
did not claim
Pandacan as
a suburb.

“ I have referred to General Merritt’s letter * of August 20, which you mention, and find that it is as you state. Unfortunately I am bound by the terms of capitulation which recite ‘the city and defences of Manila and its suburbs.’ Pandacan, is certainly far within the lines of defence, and, from information obtained from two weighty sources, I have been led to believe that it has of late been considered one of the city’s suburbs, although we have been unable to find any Spanish decree which fixes its status with definiteness.

“ In regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp for the restoration to health of members of my command, it was my intention to consult you and arrive at an understanding in the matter before attempting anything of the kind. I knew you would not offer objections if it could be so placed as not to give your people annoyance, since it could not be in any wise a menace, but on the contrary, would place our sick within your power and, to a certain extent, under your protection. I have that confidence in your humane sentiments and in the kindly impulses of your people as to believe that you would surely consent to a measure of this character, and I think the poorer classes of surrounding communities would be pecuniarily benefited by the small trade that it would give rise to, as hospitals make many purchases of edible products which your people would be glad to furnish. Should necessity arise under which I would be forced to take action, it will be my pleasure to confer with you before proceeding in the matter, and I am fully convinced that you will give assent and assistance.

“ Permit me, General, to assure you that I fully appreciate the difficulty under which you labor in your endeavors to carry out the desires and demands of your people. As I have already expressed myself in former communications, I

* See page 29 of this pamphlet.

am fully convinced of your wish to maintain harmonious relations with the United States forces and government of Manila, and that you deplore, with me, any proceeding which may disturb that harmony and friendly feeling. I have been fully aware, that, all unpleasant incidents which have occurred, and to which I alluded in my former letter, were due entirely to irresponsible and unwarranted action of subordinates, and I am constantly called upon to correct misconceptions entertained by my troops and to punish offences which they have wantonly committed.

"I am gratified at the success both as concerns the interests of the Filipino people and the United States troops, which has attended our mutual efforts for the amicable adjustment of affairs and sincerely hope that the manifested good will which now exists by and between our forces may be long continued. Mutual efforts at amicable adjustment.

"I am, general, most sincerely, your obedient servant,

"E. S. OTIS,

"Major-General U. S. V.

"United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

"REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,

"Presidency Malolos, November 4, 1898.

"Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

"Commander-in-Chief of the

"American Forces of Occupation of Manila.

"GENERAL: In having the honor of answering your letter of the 27th of October last, I shall make no mention of the first paragraphs of the same, because I see, with pleasure, that the matter referred to in them has had its solution adjusted to your desires.

"I shall limit myself only to the last paragraphs that speak of the establishment of a camp for convalescents. Concerning this paragraph, I also observe that from the moment when a concession is made of a part of the territory occupied by our forces and a hospital is built in it, you will have to place

there a force in charge to look after the interests there created, unless it depends for security solely and exclusively upon the guaranty offered by the laws dictated by our government.

“You, yourself, General, have always impressed me more than once with the fact of the impossibility of a dual occupation of Manila, because the continual contact of your forces and mine might give place to innumerable disagreeable incidents, if not serious and grave conflicts, which may disturb the harmony that exists between us. I am fully aware of the humanity you invoke in favor of the sick, but on the strength of this consideration it is my sacred duty to look after the millions of souls whose security and interests would be compromised if a conflict between us should ensue. The only solution possible is to completely cede you the use of this encampment, and this, as you will understand, requires some fixed basis of arrangement more concrete than can result from the verbal one made in a conference. Besides it is my duty to submit these conditions to the representatives of the people.

“It is not lack of confidence which obliges me to proceed in this manner ; it is necessity. These bases, if in the meanwhile, a friendly convention between your government and mine is not realized, will constitute the provisional rules that will serve as the form for the solution of the claims that might occur.

“And, above all, these bases will contribute very much to perpetuate the friendship that exists between us, because my people will take great care not to break them.

“I am, with the greatest consideration, your attentive and obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

“OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINES,

“*Manila, P. I., November 10, 1898.*

“Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

“*Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.*

“GENERAL: I received with pleasure your note of the 4th instant, and have the honor to reply to the point you present

in regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp beyond the present line of actual occupation by the United States troops, as follows:

“ I am not convinced that such establishment will be at all necessary, and, in fact, from present indications it would appear that we shall be able to care for our sick within the line and defences of Manila. **Convalescent camp not needed.**”

“ With regard to right of occupancy of territory, so many international questions arise under the articles of capitulation with Spain that the United States is in honor bound to strictly construe and obey in all matters affecting its action, that I do not intend to present them for determination if it can be consistently avoided, especially not those which might demand argument and decision such, for instance, as might arise regarding shore lines which rightful occupation by the United States of the bay and harbor of Manila with conceded rights of use for commercial purposes might involve.

“ I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

“ E. S. OTIS,

“ *Major-General U. S. V.,*

“ *United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*”

V. TREATMENT OF PRISONERS.

A. Cables from Admiral Dewey.*

[*Outline:* Cable from Washington, asking information concerning treatment of prisoners by insurgents — Cable from Dewey, prisoners not cruelly treated — Cable from Washington, observe conciliatory course to all.]

“WASHINGTON, *Aug.* 29, 1898.

“DEWEY, *Manila:*

“At the instance of the French ambassador, information concerning treatment of Spanish prisoners by insurgents is requested.

“ALLEN, *Acting Secretary.*

“MANILA, *August 31,* 1898.

“SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, *Washington:*

“Referring to your telegram of August 29, from my observation and that of my officers, the Spanish prisoners are not treated cruelly by the insurgents, but they are neglected, not from design, but owing to want of proper food supply, medical outfit, and attendance.

“DEWEY.

“WASHINGTON, *Sept.* 7, 1898.

“DEWEY, *Manila:*

“By direction of the President, you will exert your influence during the suspension of hostilities between the United States and Spain to restrain insurgent hostilities towards Spaniards, and while maintaining a position of rightful supremacy as to the insurgents to pursue, so far as possible, a conciliatory course to all.

“ALLEN, *Acting Secretary.*”

* Report of Rear Admiral George Dewey, for 1898, page 65.

Spanish
prisoners not
cruelly
treated by
insurgents.

B. Correspondence Between General Otis and Aguinaldo.*

(From November 2 to 18.)

[*Outline:* Letter from Otis, asks for release of priests who, he says, according to strict international law cannot be held as prisoners of war— Letter from Aguinaldo, explaining that Spanish "Sacerdotes" do not come under international law, as (1) they are peculiar to Spain, (2) they have borne arms in recent struggle— Letter from Otis, gives further arguments for request that priests be released— Letter from Aguinaldo, answering these arguments— Statement from Otis that no reply was sent to this last letter— Summary by Otis.]

"During the latter part of October instructions were received from Washington, directing that effort be made to secure the release of members of the Spanish clergy and religious orders who were held by the insurgent government as prisoners of war. Correspondence ensued and is here given to serve as a basis for comment in a later portion of this report. Four communications passed, of which the following are copies :

"OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
 " *Manila, P. I., November 2, 1898.*

"Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

" *Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.*

"GENERAL: By direction of my Government I have the honor to present for your distinguished consideration a subject which is causing much comment and a great deal of severe criticism of the Filipino people throughout Europe and among the very large class of Catholic citizens of my own country, and that is the retention, as prisoners of war, of the Spanish Catholic clergy and nuns. I believe that a vast majority of the reports of great cruelty and barbarous treatment practised by the Filipinos toward these individuals which have been put in general circulation are untrue. Indeed, I have

General Otis
 asks for re-
 lease of
 priests.

* Otis Report, pages 22-28.

forbidden cablegrams prepared on this subject, which I had good reason to suppose could not be substantiated, to be sent to other countries, and I have informed the United States authorities that many rumors of this nature in circulation throughout the civilized world were greatly exaggerated. Still, however, the facts stand out prominently that these individuals have suffered privations and hardships and are still held in captivity, and fabrications charging most cruel and inhuman treatment resulting in loss of life will continue to be spread abroad to the great detriment of the interests and welfare of the Filipino people. I do not consider that I sacrifice in any particular the confidence reposed in me by my government in communicating to you that it has been requested by the Vatican at Rome, and by many distinguished men, high in the councils of nations, to employ its good offices in efforts to secure the liberty of the Spanish clergy and of all individuals connected with religious orders now held in durance, among whom are especially mentioned the Bishop of New Segovia and nuns in the northwestern part of the Island of Luzon.

**Otis says
clergy cannot
be held as
prisoners of
war.**

“It is, of course, needless for me to present to you or the able councillors by whom you are surrounded, and indeed it may be considered a presumption on my part to invite your attention to the fact that this clergy, and, indeed, the civil functionaries of the Spanish government, cannot under a strict interpretation of the rules of international law be deemed prisoners of war except in certain very aggravated cases. It would require most decided action on the part of members of religious orders to place them in that category and the seizure and retention of nuns or interference with them in the practice of what they consider their duties, under their sacred religious vows, is invariably looked upon with marked disfavor by all nations claiming to practise civilized warfare. All this is well known to you, and I only allude to it to account, in a measure, for the erroneous impressions which publicly prevail regarding the humane sentiments and good intentions cherished by the Filipinos, and which are so

damaging to them in securing a position as a people which they seek to invoke. You will please pardon me for this allusion, but the matter is so important to the best interests of the Filipinos that I have taken the liberty, uninvited, to present it.

"Confident that you seek the welfare of your people, may I, in that confidence, ask you to use your conceded influence to correct this condition of affairs and to act with me in efforts to place these prisoners in a position which will put an end to the acrimonious criticisms which now so widely prevail? I would be pleased to receive them here at Manila and care for them while they make preparations to leave the country, as I am informed many of them desire to do; and more particularly does it appear to me as most essential that prompt action be taken with regard to the nuns. Any traveling expense or cost of food required to effect their removal to this point I would be glad to meet should you desire it.

"I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"E. S. OTIS,

Major-General U. S. V.,

"United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

"REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,

"Presidency, Malolos, November 3, 1898.

"Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

"Commander-in-Chief of

"American Forces of Occupation in the Philippines.

"GENERAL: I take pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your kind communication of yesterday's date, and I ought to tell you that your observations, far from displeasing me, are very useful to me, as they are dictated by the enlightenment acquired in the atmosphere of a free country.

Aguinaldo says Filipinos do not make prisoners of women and children.

"I ought also to inform you, especially, that we do not make prisoners of women and children, and much less of the nuns. If some woman or child is found among our prisoners it is because they are part of the family of one from whom

they do not wish to be separated, requiring us to support them at the expense of the Philippine treasury. This detail is not foreseen in international law, but the Filipinos observe this custom, prompted by humane sentiments.

“I am glad to hear you say that the Spanish clergy and civil officials cannot be prisoners of war according to international law. Before answering this point allow me to observe that we have only taken as prisoners the priests (sacerdotes religiosos) belonging to the Spanish clergy and not those who live the life of monks; and permit me to make this point clear in order that the explanation which I have the pleasure of giving you may be more intelligible, and so, also, that foreign public opinion may not be mistaken. It is true that international law declares in general that the clergy and civil officials cannot be prisoners of war, but the spirit of these very laws exclude the Spanish priests (sacerdotes religiosos) and civil officials in the Philippines, because they (Spaniards) alone possess the certain class of persons known by that name.

**Aguinaldo
says clergy
bore arms in
recent strug-
gle.**

“Beginning with the Spanish civil officials I take the liberty of pointing out to you that at the beginning of the declaration of war between the United States and Spain they were obliged by General Augustin to bear arms, without distinction as to class, and even before, during the first stages of the Philippine Revolution, Spanish civil officials were already formed into armed volunteer corps, who, if they did not frequently go into the field in company with the regular soldiers, shot and arrested defenceless and pacific inhabitants in order to imprison them and submit them to indescribable torture. Besides, I ought also to say that in the Spanish penal prisons and penitentiaries groan even hundreds of prisoners and deported Filipinos who were torn away from their homes on account of the suspicions of the old Spanish government, and thanks to the arts and malicious customs of the priests (sacerdotes religiosos) called ministers of peace.

Relative to the priests, or rather Spanish “sacerdotes religiosos,” I take the liberty of laying before you the following points :

“ A. The religious corporations of the Philippines have acquired large agricultural colonies by means of fraud. In olden times the Filipinos, prompted by their religion, gave away a part of the products of their lands to the old priests (sacerdotes religiosos) for their support. But in the course of time that which was prompted by spiritual motives they made obligatory, taking possession of the lands in order to better secure it, and making the proprietors dependents or colonists who could not refuse paying because of the vengeance of the Spanish authorities, whom the said sacerdotes had in their favor, through bribery.

“ B. According to the canons of the Roman Church, these priests or religious sacerdotes cannot claim the privilege of absolving, which is solely reserved to the secular clergy to which the Filipino priests belong. Nevertheless, the ecclesiastics, in order to be able to exercise the duties of parochial priest (cura parroco) in the Philippine towns, have been cheating the Vatican and foreign public opinion, picturing these towns as savage ranches which require the care of Spanish religious missionaries, that the natives may not return to their ancient idolatry. The Filipino priests who have tried to rectify this false opinion of the Vatican relative to the religious state of the country, in order to be obedient to the canons of the church, died martyrs, accused by the ecclesiastics of being disturbers.

**Aguinaldo
explains
ecclesiastical
abuses.**

“ C. The same priests (sacerdotes religiosos) tried also to cheat the Spanish government, making it believe that they were the only upholders of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, and although the Spanish authorities recognized the fraud, they did not want to admit anything, as they were influenced by the gold of the religious corporations. These priests, exercising the right of absolving in the Philippine towns, have been for a long time the absolute masters of the life, honor, and property of the Filipinos. For this reason, it is a widely known and notorious fact, recognized by all the foreigners who have studied Philippine affairs, that the primary causes of the Filipino Revolution were the ecclesiastical corporations, which,

taking advantage of the corrupt Spanish government, have robbed the country, preventing progress and liberty.

“ With these antecedents, General, you will understand that, owing to the influence and interests of the religious corporations in the Philippines, it is neither just nor politic to set at liberty the priests (sacerdotes religiosos). The Archbishop as well as the Spanish bishops in the Philippines belong to the regular Spanish clergy, and it is not prudent to allow them to continue ruling in these islands, as they can incite a counter revolution, assisted by their gold and some fanatic Filipinos who still obey their commands.

“ When the Filipino priests, unjustly spurned by the Vatican, have obtained the right to appointment to the duties of bishops and parochial priests, then there will be no danger to the public tranquillity in setting at liberty the ecclesiastics. The Spanish government and the Pope have proven themselves ignorant of law or justice, when one deals with their interests. For that reason the Filipinos wish to hold the civil officials in order to obtain the liberty of the prisoners and deported Filipinos; and the priests, in order to obtain from the Vatican the recognition of the Philippine clergy.

“ As a representative of the government of the United States I beg of you, General, with the greatest kindness, to notify it that neither vengeance nor hate influence the Filipinos when they hold the civil officials and Spanish ecclesiastics, but that public interests and the peace of the Philippine people demand these measures. International law will have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization, and progress. My people exact these measures and I cannot but comply with their will. If you, General, can interpret the sentiments of the people to your government and foreign public opinion, and by this means correct the erroneous ideas emanating from the ignorance of the true condition of the country, you will make yourself a creditor to the gratitude of the Filipino people and the civilized world.

“ I am, with the greatest consideration, your most obedient servant,

“ EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Aguinaldo says public interests and peace demand that priests shall be retained.

"OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

"Manila, P. I., November 10, 1898.

"Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

"Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces,

"Malolos, P. I.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your cordial communication of the 3d instant, for which permit me to thank you, and to which my manifold duties have denied me the pleasure of replying as promptly as I wished.

"I highly appreciate your expressed desire to act for the public interests, the peace of the Filipinos, and in accordance with the dictates of humanity, but you will pardon my candid confession that I am unable to comprehend the force of your remark to the effect that international law must give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls because it is one of humanity. I fail to understand how the principles of that law can be antagonistic in any particular to the welfare of a people, founded, as they are, on the best interpretation of the law of nature, which the acknowledged wisdom of ages of human progress has been able to bestow. Every independent nation claiming advanced enlightenment, professes to be bound by these obligations of that law, and certainly would be held responsible by the civilized world should it openly violate them.

Otis says that every nation claiming enlightenment is bound by obligations of law.

"My previous letter contained the request of my Government for the release of the clergy and members of religious orders, including nuns of a certain locality, reported to be held by you as prisoners of war. Your reply informs me that you hold as such prisoners the Spanish priests and former civil officials, but not women and children, 'much less nuns.' In regard to the latter, I must have been misinformed, for I received the impression that they sought return of their personal effects, of which they have been deprived, with permission to join their friends in this city.

Your letter, however, assures me that they have not been despoiled, and possess full liberty of action to journey where-soever they please. This information I will gladly convey to my Government and to persons immediately interested in their welfare who have expressed concern for their safety as regards health, life, and individual property.

Otis summarizes Aguinardo's position.

"In respect to the Spanish officials whom you hold as prisoners of war, you are pleased to remark that during the first stages of the Filipino revolution they were formed into an armed volunteer corp, were subsequently obliged to bear arms without distinction as to class, and that if they did not frequently take the field with the army of the enemy, nevertheless shot and arrested peaceable and defenceless inhabitants. These you desire to retain until opportunity offers to exchange them for Filipino prisoners now in the hands of Spain. I am not conversant with the facts you narrate, and am not, therefore, competent to arrive at any conclusions. It is, however, a well-established principle of law that the chief officers of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who are of particular importance and use to it, become, upon capture, prisoners of war, but I do not think that its minor officials are classed in that category, unless armed or attached in some capacity to a hostile army for the purpose of rendering active aid.

"As regards the members of the Spanish clergy, I understand you to state in substance, that they are held as prisoners of war on account of the grave offences committed by them while Luzon was under the practical domination of Spain; that they were the primary and principal cause of the revolution which has been in progress for the past two years; that it is not prudent to set them at liberty, as they are disposed and might be able, if released, to incite a counter revolution in Spanish interests, and that they are retained in prison not only for such reasons, but also to compel the Vatican to recognize the conceded rights of the Filipino clergy which has heretofore been denied it.

"Accepting these as established facts (my knowledge is

not to the contrary), the conclusion does not appear to follow that these members of the clergy can be considered prisoners of war, and I cannot conceive how, under the laws of war, or any international right arising from the state of belligerency existing between the Filipinos and Spain, they can be so denominated. Nor do I understand your suggestion that the spirit of these laws, if not their context, excludes these people from the protection which strict interpretation bestows, whatever may have been their previous crimes. Even if these priests belonged to religious corporations, against which the Filipinos had well-grounded complaint for past offences, and indeed for cruelties received at their hands; even if they exhorted the communities in which they reside to resist the revolutionists, and might still do so if released; even if they persecuted the Spanish subjects among whom they lived, they could not be considered as prisoners of war in any sense of that term unless captured while making armed resistance or giving active armed aid to the enemy.

“The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon another, and concedes the right of revolution to a people greatly oppressed, but it does not admit of violation of the rules of regular warfare, regarding the status of persons arrested or captured, or in the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may belong to the forces of an unjust assailant, or a former tyrannical master.

“The expressed intention of holding these Spanish priests as prisoners of war in order to force the Vatican at Rome into certain acknowledgments with appropriate action, I cannot conceive to be well founded in law, custom, or precedent, and am convinced that such a position is untenable.

Otis says intention of holding priests as prisoners of war not well founded in law.

“In this somewhat hasty letter, General, I have accepted all your facts for the sake of argument, and am unable to reach your conclusion, viz., that the members of the religious orders are rightfully kept in prison, and that the interests of the Filipino people demand their retention. I do not think that the views you advance would receive favorable general acceptance, and believe therefore, in all sincerity, that the

good name, reputation, and welfare of that people would be greatly enhanced by relieving those men from the captivity which they have so long endured.

"I can only ask in conclusion that the wishes of my Government may receive more favorable consideration than your most friendly letter indicates.

"I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"E. S. OTIS.

"*Major-General U. S. V.,*

"*United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*

"PRESIDENCY REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

"MALOLOS, *November 18, 1898.*

"To Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

"*General in Chief of the*

"*American forces of Occupation in Manila.*

"GENERAL: Allow me to inform you that I have received your kind letter of the 10th instant; begging you to pardon the tardiness with which I answer, because of my many occupations.

"I highly appreciate your desire to intercede for the liberty of the Spanish civil officials and the priests, and be assured that if well founded reasons did not exist in order to retain them, always attentive to the laws of humanity and agreeing with the principles that regulate the relations of independent states, I would not have given you occasion to make in their favor the petition that elevates you so much.

"In my last letter I have advanced the reasons which I have convinced myself justifies me in considering as prisoners of war said employees and ecclesiastics. Nevertheless, you attempt to depreciate the force of my arguments, relative to which I beg of you to kindly favor me by listening to my answer.

"You say in your letter that in virtue of the principles of a right well established the chief employee of a hostile government as well as diplomatic agents and those that rendered

**Aguinaldo
urges Fili-
pinos have
well-founded
reasons for
retaining
priests.**

services of a particular importance, can be considered as prisoners of war; but that you do not think mere employees can be classified in said category, unless they are armed or in some way attached to a hostile army for the purpose of lending their active aid. And in view of this assertion, coming from a person so competent, I cannot do less than congratulate myself, for in that statement you recognize as justified the principal reason that I uphold in retaining as prisoners the civil employees as well as the priests.

“Admitting that principle, it must be confessed that it is strictly in conformity with my conduct if it is admitted (an undeniable fact) that the civil employees, as well as the regular priests (parrocos) not only supported in an active way those who combated against the Filipino revolutionists, but also personally took up arms in order to fight against them.

“I have already said, in my last letter, that the decree of General Augustin of the 23d of last April obliged not only the employees of state and municipality to take up arms, but also the Spaniards born here, and that in the first epoch of Filipino revolution they formed armed volunteer corps which, while guarding the towns, made arrests, tortured the prisoners, executed defenceless citizens, or joined the regular soldiers to fight against the revolutionists. General, read carefully the local papers from the time the revolution began and you will see there the proof of what I say. The pages of said papers are indisputable evidence of the military services rendered by the civil employees of the Spanish Government and the compensation received by them as a premium of their services. With these antecedents is there room for the least argument that the Spanish civil employees should not be held as prisoners of war? Statement of reasons.

“The same, if not worse, can be said of the priests. The latter degrading their office, transformed from servants of the Lord to feud lords and supported by the Spanish Government, were absolute masters of the lives, land, and honor of the Filipinos.

“At the beginning of the revolution they did not discharge

the duties of ministers of peace, or preach gentleness or Christian charity, but, profaning their sacred mission they made themselves the police of the Spanish Government, false denouncers of innocent citizens.

“It seems incredible that those who should raise their prayer to stop so much cruelty and infamy committed by the Spanish Government, those who should give themselves over to seclusion and mortification and penance for so much crime, were precisely those who took part in the affairs, and with base insinuations, infamous accusations, and ideas of vengeance, increased more and more the pyre of the dead, and the defamatory charges through which were sacrificed precious and innocent lives and the honor of many citizens.

“Again, vengeance does not move me in treating these ecclesiastics as prisoners of war. I conform to the principles of international law advanced by yourself, for, apart from the abuses committed by the priests, to which I have referred in my last letter, and the facts that I add in my present one, you are informed that they have taken up arms against the revolution; as, for example, the priests (parrocos) of the town of Lipa, province of Batangas, who made themselves leaders of volunteer corps. In Manila, during the siege of the town by your forces, all the ecclesiastics, uniformed and organized, formed a part of the municipal armed guard, and all of them you may be sure have lent their directive and effective co-operation to the forces that fought against the Filipinos, not only maintaining at their expense armed bodies, but accompanying them in their expeditions as well as inciting them to battle.

“The convents have been the most impregnable defences where the Spanish combatants, together with the priests, shielded themselves in order to attack the revolutionists, and this government preserves quite a number of muskets taken from the ecclesiastics. Therefore the principle which you mention can be applied to them, and it follows in consequence that they should be treated as prisoners of war — the more so if all their civil attributes are taken into consideration. There

**Aguinaldo
says clergy
“uniformed
and organ-
ized”
defended
Manila dur-
ing siege.**

is reason, therefore, to class them in the category of chief employees or those rendering service of special importance.

“The principles of international law sustained by the most noted authors were taken into account by me when I treated as prisoners of war civil employees and priests. Jiore, Martens, Blunstchli and others, hold that all persons, though not forming a part of the army, but who follow it to perform their pacific functions, can be held as prisoners of war. I only exempt the hospital personnel, according to the Geneva convention, provided that they take no active part in the war; and the Spanish-American encyclopedia says: ‘All those who form part of the enemy’s forces, whether they are regular troops or militia, all those who accompany armies on their expeditions, the newspaper correspondents, providers, even the civil officials can be made prisoners.’

City authorities on international law in support of his position.

“Besides, retort (reprasalias) is a right admitted by the most cultured nations as a penal power to be exercised by one of the belligerents with respect to the other when the latter violates the rules or laws generally accepted; or as a sanction in the sense that by it the reprasalia can require the enemy to fulfil his duties.

“In virtue of the right of retort, during the war of North American independence, the great Washington, to avenge the shooting of an American colonel, a prisoner in the hands of the English, deemed beyond the rules of war, the English Colonel Argyll, a prisoner held by the Americans. Thanks to the intervention of the Queen of France the order was not executed. In virtue of the same right, the German generals in the war of 1870 ordered the houses in which their soldiers had been treacherously attacked to be fired and destroyed.

“If there were then no international rules to justify the retention of the civil officials and priests as prisoners of war, could not we, Filipinos, not even considered belligerents by the other nations, invoke the right of retort in order to secure measures obliging the Spanish authorities to grant the liberty of many Filipinos (prisoners for political reasons) and check

their barbarous methods of torturing and shooting the lovers of liberty and independence of their country?

“This is the reason why, in my last letter, I said that international law would have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization, and progress.

“It is far from my intention, in making this assertion, to show you that in retaining as prisoners the persons in whose liberty you are interested, I cite international law only when attending to the desires of my people, because I have well demonstrated that in taking this determination I have really been guided by those laws, at least when they do not greatly prejudice the welfare of my people. I have only wanted to say that in many cases the principles of international law, generally observed by the most cultured of nations, must conform to existing circumstances in the interest of a people who bewail the violation of those laws. For this reason it is understood that the most civilized nations recognize the right of retort. Thus, also, General, when I told you that the Filipino people desire to hold as prisoners the civil officials in order to obtain the release of the deported Filipinos and their priests, and in order to obtain from the Vatican the rights of the Philippine clergy, I have not wished to defend the measures adopted on that ground alone, when other well-founded principles justify my conduct. I have only wished to indicate that at the opportune moment, notwithstanding the motives previously advanced, liberty can be granted to these prisoners without the displeasure of the people.

“I should like to see that moment arrive as soon as possible, to demonstrate to you my liveliest sympathy for the fulfilment of your desires, which to-day I am impeded from meeting for well-understood reasons.

“The Philippine people, who aspire to a life of liberty and independence, have not deserved from the civilized nations, not even the United States, at least until the present time, the recognition of their rights in their war against Spain.

**Aguinaldo
will release
prisoners
when he can
do so without
injury to his
people.**

They have the glory of having complied with the rules required to be observed by belligerent powers, and nothing can be said to the contrary. I have no doubt, General, that, having given your noble impulses and cultured judgment and sympathy to my country, you will know how to interpret the sentiments of this letter before your Government and the civilized world, and to justify my conduct in holding as prisoners of war the civil officials and the priests.

Claims insurgents have complied with rules of civilized warfare.

"I close this letter, begging you to pardon the trouble that its perusal will cause you.

"I remain, your most respectful servant,

"EMILIO AGUINALDO.

"The last reply, and possibly the first, was drawn by Aguinaldo's attorney-general, a person of excellent legal attainments, who is now serving as one of the United States judges in the court of the audiencia, and was considered unanswerable by the Malolos government. It received newspaper publication at Malolos and here in Manila. An answer was drafted in part, but never delivered."

VI. GROWING FRICTION.

[*Outline*; Summary by Otis — Cable from Dewey, seizure of steamship *Abby* — Summary by Otis.]

“During my first weeks of duty here, I was impressed with the spirit of suspicion and the partially concealed unfriendly feeling manifested by the Tagalos toward the American forces. That they either had very little confidence in our promises or were then forming conclusions to oppose any establishment of the United States authority in Luzon was apparent, however loudly they might disclaim hostile intent or declare as an excuse for their attitude fear of the return of Spain. I saw, however, with satisfaction, their ablest men of education and mental equipment taking part in their authoritative deliberations, and I had considerable confidence in the efficacy of their suggestions and advice. Still, after carefully weighing conditions, I was unable to arrive at any satisfactory conclusions. To a cable received on September 16, I replied the next day as follows:

“ADJUTANT-GENERAL ARMY, *Washington*:

“Referring to telegram yesterday, now think prudence dictates increased force — this after deliberation on situation appearing to-day and possible developments. Forces sufficient for present purposes, but contingencies may arise difficult to meet. Parties plotting constantly to convey erroneous impressions and excite insurgents. Demands of city government and sick list draw heavily on armed organizations. An additional 5,000 men could be used to supply losses and give greater confidence. Battalions of Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, still in San Francisco, should join at once.

“Measures were being applied constantly to improve the sanitary condition of the city, to increase the efficiency of the troops, and to meet any emergency which might develop

* Otis Report, pages 40, 41.

“Ablest men of education and mental equipment” take part in insurgent deliberations.

from an uprising of the inhabitants, or from hasty action by any portion of our or the insurgent forces, which, though maintaining amicable intercourse, were, in fact, in an attitude of resistance and hostility upon all questions involving the right of armed occupation of the suburbs and defences of Manila. The insurgent soldiers had looted extensively the portions of the city to which they gained access, and were greatly disappointed that this privilege over other parts of the same was not accorded them. Their enforced withdrawal to outer lines was the cause of discontent, and augmented any desire which they may have formerly entertained to resist or attack the American troops. This growing discontent was observable among the lower classes of the city's inhabitants, from whom a considerable share of Aguinaldo's army was drawn, and was undoubtedly increased by the reprehensible conduct and illegal actions of some of our own men, who were severely punished for their misdeeds when detected. Outwardly, however, relations of the most friendly character were maintained. The officers and enlisted men of the two armies mingled in friendly social intercourse. To the casual observer the only discordant element in this dense population, made up of every nation and tongue in existence, were the hated Spanish prisoners, whom the Filipinos still longed to persecute and kill, and who were obliged to keep within the walls of Old Manila for safety.

**Bad conduct
of both in-
surgent and
United States
troops.**

“Repeated conferences were held with influential insurgents, whose chief aim appeared to be to obtain some authoritative expression of the intent of the United States, with regard to the Philippines, and complained that they were unable to discover anyone who could speak ex cathedra. They asserted that their Malolos arrangement was a government de facto, which had the right to ask an expression of intent from the United States Government.”

“[SEIZURE OF STEAMER ABBY.]”*

“(Received at Washington, D. C., Sept. 27, 1898.)

“SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington:

“Having received information American steamer *Abby* left Macao Sept. 21, with cargo of arms for Batangas sent *McCulloch*.

Insurgent
steamer
Abby seized.

“Arrived Batangas 23d, found her in harbor, having arrived three days earlier and landed cargo. Only Filipinos on board. They refused to give any information and had no papers whatever. Seized and brought her here, where now hold her. This steamer, formerly *Pasig*, registered American vessel. United States consulate, Canton, have information she made one voyage of same kind before.

“DEWEY.

“7.12 A. M.”

SUMMARY OF SITUATION.†

“This period [*the latter months of 1898*] was one of plotting in the interests of the insurgent cause and men of every nationality appeared to be engaged in questionable enterprises promising individual gain. Rumors of the purchase and introduction of arms and ammunition at various ports on the Luzon coast were incessant. Admiral Dewey had seized a vessel at Batangas engaged in this contraband trade, but the cargo had entered the interior. It was an understood fact that money in considerable quantities was being sent to the insurgent junta at Hongkong, which was then presided over, or at least advised by, an American citizen and a British subject. Insurgent delegations departed for Japan and the cities on the Asiatic coast. All this occasioned a mass of correspondence with United States representatives stationed in these countries. Smuggling and illicit trade of a varied character were being actively conducted, and the cunning of the Filipino and the Chinese was difficult to

* Report of Rear Admiral George Dewey for 1898, page 66.

† Otis Report, page 53.

contend with. Insurgent newspapers had been established in our midst, and often indulged in criticisms of the manner in which affairs were being conducted, but were generally busy insinuating that the United States offered nothing advantageous to the Filipinos, who had expended so much blood and treasure for their independence. The formerly expressed fear that Spain would return had given way to the statement that it was the intention of the United States to replace her in the odious domination which she had exercised for centuries. The better class of Filipinos recommended the suppression of these Filipino newspapers, and to my question whether the people believed the statements found in them, replied that they did, and were greatly impressed. The editors were warned, and became more temperate in their denunciations, even asking assistance to place before the people the true condition of affairs. Able articles were prepared and furnished, at my request, by the well-known scientist, Dr. Becker, upon the true theory of government and the probable intention of the United States in Luzon and other islands. They were generally used by these editors as targets for such unfriendly criticisms as their supple and peculiar minds could invent. A sanguinary and venomous article would be followed for three or four successive days by temperate productions favoring United States' protection on lines which they were powerless to explain or understand."

Fear expressed that the United States would replace the hated rule of the Spaniards.

VII. ENLARGED UNITED STATES SPHERE OF ACTION.*

[*Outline*: Summary by Otis — Cablegram, Otis to Washington, shall troops be sent to Iloilo? — Reply cable, Yes, but avoid conflict — Cable, Otis to General Rios, Spanish Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, United States force is ordered to Iloilo — Telegram, Otis to Dewey, nothing heard from Iloilo expedition — Telegram, Otis to Dewey, forwarding telegrams that state, Rios on his way to Manila, Iloilo evacuated, December 24 — Telegram, Otis to Dewey, thinks Spaniards still hold Iloilo — Cable, Otis to Washington, same as above — Letter, Otis to Colonel Potter, Admiral Dewey thinks expedition to Iloilo should be recalled, Otis does not agree — Cable, Otis to Washington, all military stations outside of Luzon except Zamboanga turned over by Spaniards to insurgents, situation requires delicate manipulation, conditions not understood in United States.]

“The sphere of the United States action in the Philippines was now about to be enlarged. During the last interview with General Rios’s staff officer on the subject of interisland trade, alluded to in a former portion of this report, he submitted a proposition for the relief of the Spanish garrison at Iloilo by our troops, saying that General Rios would be pleased to turn that city over to the United States authorities and withdraw to Zamboanga. The proposition was discussed, but immediate action was not considered practicable, and he was requested to convey to the general, our appreciation of his offer and to report that permission would be sought to accept it as soon as the Paris treaty negotiations indicated unmistakably that the United States would succeed to the government of the islands. About December 13 a petition was received, signed by business men and firms of Iloilo, asking for American protection there. On December 14 I cabled to Washington the following :

Move to extend United States control to the Visayan Islands.

* Otis Report, pages 54-61.

“ Bankers and merchants with business houses at Iloilo petition American protection at Iloilo. Spanish authorities are still holding out, but will receive United States troops. Insurgents reported favorable to American annexation. Can send troops. Shall any action be taken ?

Merchants
at Iloilo
request
American
protection.

“ No response was received until the 19th of that month when I was informed that the President and Secretary were absent from Washington, and that a consideration of my question would await their return, which would be shortly. Appreciating the great desirability of securing possession of this city, the second of the Philippines in importance, I was anxious to receive an affirmative answer to my cable question of the 14th instant. It was reported that the Spanish troops were hard pressed by the insurgents, who had made an attack a few days previous, declaring that they would capture the town before the arrival of the Americans. It was also stated that the attack had been repulsed, with a loss to the insurgents of three hundred men.

“ The petition for protection which had been submitted by the business men appeared to me to furnish sufficient ground upon which to base intervention in their behalf, independent of specific instructions from Washington, and I, therefore, in conference with Admiral Dewey, asked that one of his war vessels convoy troops which I meditated sending to Iloilo at once. This the Admiral thought it not wise to do, as we were awaiting authority which had already been sought, and, furthermore, he was of the opinion General Rios would hold out. I shared with him this latter conviction and waited directions. On December 23 the following dispatch was received :

“ WASHINGTON, *December 23, 1898.*

“ OTIS, *Manila :*

“ Answering your message, December 14, the President directs that you send necessary troops to Iloilo, to preserve the peace and protect life and property. It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm.

“ By order of the Secretary of War.

“These instructions were conveyed to Admiral Dewey and I cabled the following :

“MANILA, December 23, 1898.

“General RIOS,

“*Governor-General Philippine Islands, Iloilo, Panay :*

“A considerable United States force, Army and Navy, will leave Manila in two or three days, and its commanding general is ordered to confer with you at Iloilo.

“OTIS,

“*United States Military Governor.*

“This message was sent to Capiz, a northern point of the island of Panay, then the terminus of the cable, whence messages were telegraphed overland to Iloilo before the insurgents had destroyed the land lines. Cable messages were sent subsequently by special gunboats, which reported for them at short intervals. The next morning the superintendent of the cable company surprised me with the information that two gunboats arrived at Capiz the day before, collected all telegrams and left for Iloilo at 5.35 p. m., that my dispatch did not reach the cable office there until 5.50 p. m., that the cable operator reported that General Rios would leave Iloilo with all Spaniards for Lambagan the afternoon of the 24th, and would go to Manila by the end of the month. Efforts were immediately made to communicate by other means with General Rios before he could evacuate the city. A coasting vessel was secured, with which Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, of the engineer corps, was directed to proceed, and if possible, communicate in person with General Rios, requesting that he continue in possession of the city until the arrival of our troops. Colonel Potter departed on his mission that night and nothing was heard from him until the morning of the 28th, when he returned. He reported that General Rios had evacuated on the evening of the 24th, thirty-nine hours before his arrival; that he found the insurgents in possession of the city; that he had landed and held an interview with the consul for Great Britain, and that the town was quiet,

Efforts to reach General Rios before he can evacuate.

Aguinaldo's flag flying, and that he could not reach any conclusions as to the probable results of General Miller's arrival; that he saw the latter on the evening of the 27th and reported to him fully the situation as he had found it. On the morning of the 27th I telegraphed Admiral Dewey, at Cavite, as follows:

Aguinaldo's
flag flying
over quiet
city of Iloilo.

"Nothing from Colonel Potter. Capiz reports having seen vessel off shore last evening and thinks that possibly insurgent authorities there would not permit landing. If Potter remains at Iloilo, Rios still holds out. Should he arrive here within next twelve hours Rios has evacuated.

"I thereafter telegraphed Admiral Dewey the substance of two dispatches as soon as delivered, which were as follows:—

"ILOILO, *December 24.*

"Treaty of Paris signed; my government orders me to go to Manila, where I shall arrive at end of month, and in accordance with your excellency will hasten repatriation.

"General RIOS.

"Also:

"Steamer which arrived yesterday at Capiz is Spanish gunboat *Elcano*. Iloilo evacuated on the 24th.

"This last message was received from the cable company. I also telegraphed the Admiral that "Colonel Potter not having reported, I am inclined to think that the Spaniards still hold Iloilo." I then cabled the following:

"ADJUTANT GENERAL, *Washington*:

"Iloilo expedition left last night. Reported that Spanish forces evacuated the 24th instant. Report not confirmed. General Miller fully instructed as to action whether Spanish forces there or not. Action to accord fully with President's directions. Will cable results as soon as possible. Expedition should reach Iloilo to-morrow morning."

[*Summary of Omissions*: General orders No. 39, constituting Separate Brigade of Eighth Corps, under Brig.-Gen. M. P. Miller, U. S. V. — Instructions to him, Dec. 24, 1898 — Further instructions, Dec. 26 — The brigade sails for Iloilo, taking natives as interpreters, etc., Dec. 26 — Further Instructions, Dec. 28.]

“ HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
 “ *Manila, P. I., December 28, 1898.*

“ Lieut. Col. C. L. POTTER,
 “ *Chief Engineer Officer, Department Pacific and*
 “ *Eighth Army Corps.*

“ SIR: Since delivering to you instructions for General Miller, I am in receipt of a dispatch from Admiral Dewey saying it is not practicable to send the *Callao* to Iloilo, and he further thinks the proper thing now to do is to recall the expedition, as the insurgents are in full possession and will probably not give up without a fight. This expression of view on the part of the admiral only confirms my view that you should use every possible means of conciliation, and still I am not of the belief that the expedition can be returned. Better that we leave the war vessel and a small force to confront Iloilo and scatter the force to other ports in the southern islands, where troops are very much needed at the present time. You will therefore inform General Miller to be governed by these views as nearly as possible. I will try and send further information in regard to the condition of the islands to-morrow or next day. Notwithstanding all this, I still hold to my view that Iloilo must be taken.

“ Very respectfully,

“ E. S. OTIS,
 “ *Major-General U. S. V., Commanding.*

“ Lieutenant-Colonel Potter sailed as soon as he had received these instructions. I then cabled to the Adjutant-General of the army such information as I had obtained from Iloilo, adding in my dispatch that I could not arrive at conclusion as to results, and would not hear from there for four days, as cable communication had been destroyed; that the Spanish forces had evacuated all stations in the southern islands, except Zamboanga, by orders, as they asserted, from Madrid. On December 30 I cabled Washington that —

“ All military stations outside of Luzon, with the exception of Zamboanga, turned over by Spaniards to inhabitants, who

Otis still
 thinks Iloilo
 should be
 taken.

may be denominated insurgents with more or less hostility to the United States. Some points we can take without friction, and could have taken nearly all outside of Luzon peaceably before the 23d and 24th of the month, when Spain withdrew her forces without our knowledge. Am waiting to hear results from Iloilo, and am meditating action in islands of Leyte, Samar, and Cebu, in all of which Luzon insurgents have been at work for several months. Conditions here at Manila and character of inhabitants not understood in the United States. Large number of insurgent troops still in the field, scattered throughout Luzon provinces, and about 6,000 outside this city, which contains large numbers of sympathizers, who have threatened uprising. Former insurgent cabinet disrupted, provisional one formed, consisting mostly of irresponsible men who demand complete independence and war with the United States. The situation requires delicate manipulation, and our troops here cannot be widely scattered at present. Great majority of men of property desire annexation, others seek personal advancement and plunder, promises of which hold insurgents together, but already much dissatisfaction in ranks and conflict with inhabitants in middle provinces. Will report further in a few days. Am in consultation with Admiral Dewey, now engaged in efforts to stop shipment of insurgent arms from China and Japan through meditated seizure. We will probably send another force south within a short time."

Situation
requires
delicate
manipulation

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1. To inform themselves, as fully and as accurately as possible, as to the true state of affairs in the Philippine Islands.
2. To circulate accurate information, by informal conversation, by inducing others to study the facts collected, and by sending to the Secretary the names of people who may be thought to be interested.

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